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Service Contracting (PBSC) and provide a clear description of PBSC to Turkish Department 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
We live in a commercial world in which most government agencies and 
commercial firms conduct business with one another. Today, the world is very 
competitive and no agency or firm can do everything own its own. They usually use 
outsourcing to perform their mission, and their primary tool for outsourcing is service 
contracting. These contracts provide a wide range of services that touch upon many or all 
of a given agency’s activities. These include health care, support to intelligence activities, 
contracting support, and various professional, management and administrative services 
such as budget and program management. In addition, service contracts provide a wide 
range of support to U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, including base support, weapons 
and equipment maintenance, communication support, interrogators, security, engineering 
support, and administrative support (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2009). 
However, it is difficult to ensure that the government gets the best value for the 
taxpayers’ money and obtains quality services in a cost-efficient and effective manner in 
every service contract. Every contract has risk that the government may receive products 
or services that are over budget, delivered late or of unacceptable quality. To deal with 
these kinds of problems, Performance-Based Service Contracting (PBSC) may be a 
solution for government agencies. Government can use PBSC as a method of procuring 
services from the private sector. 
In traditional service contracts, agencies usually spend their time preparing 
detailed specifications or performance work statements for the contractors. The aim of 
these documents is to tell how the contractor must go about meeting the agencies’ needs. 
In these documents, the government agencies dictate their solutions to the contractors. By 
doing so, government agencies try to solve their problems with outside help instead of 
doing it themselves. By binding the contractors to work statements, agencies impose their 
solutions on the contractors. 
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To avoid this traditional way and get the best performance from service 
contracting, PBSC has been developed and mandated in the United States. “Performance-
based contracting methods are intended to ensure that required performance quality levels 
are achieved and that total payment is related to the degree that services performed meet 
contract standards. The theory of performance-based service contracting is that it 
improves the quality of services, results in cost savings, maximizes competition and 
innovation, and shifts the risk from the government to industry because the contractor is 
responsible for achieving the objectives” (Department of Defense Inspector General, 
2007). In this procurement concept, agencies just describe their needs in terms of what is 
to be achieved rather than how it is to be performed. 
In the United States, PBSC has been around for many years, and mandated in 
government since the early 1990s. Policies encouraging and mandating PBSC have been 
in place for more than 20 years. Implementing performance-based service contracting is 
not just a DoD initiative; various organizations use PBSC. In the last decade, using PBSC 
in federal government acquisition activities has become a top government management 
priority, reinforced at several levels throughout the federal government, including:  
• The President's Management Objectives  
• Congressional Intent 
• The Procurement Executives Councils (PEC)  
• The Department of Defense  
• Defense Components  
Although service contracting is used to support Turkish Ministry of Defense 
activities, this acquisition concept, though widely used in the United States, is not known 
in Turkey. In the near future, most of the service support for Ministry of Defense 
activities will be outsourced to the private sector. In parallel with current trends, PBSC 
will become an important tool to assure that Turkish taxpayers are receiving the best 
value for the services purchased by their government. The main goal of this research is to 
analyze PBSC and then assess its benefits to Turkish taxpayers. To achieve the goal, this 
study analyzes PBSC’s background and history, current implementation in the U.S., and 
benefits and challenges. The current Turkish procurement environment and regulations 
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are also reviewed to reveal potential problems if PBSC is implemented in Turkey. After 
the analysis, a recommendation is made as to whether PBSC should be implemented into 
the Turkish Ministry of Defense.  
B. SCOPE 
This research focuses on: a literature review and historical development of 
Performance-Based Service Contracting (PBSC), the philosophy behind this concept, 
expected outcome and objectives of PBSC, current implementation in the U.S., important 
features of PBSC and the contract management process for performance-based service 
contracts, expectations and benefits of PBSC, challenges and problems experienced with 
PBSC. The current Turkey Ministry of Defense acquisition environment and current 
Turkish rules and regulations on government acquisition are reviewed and 
recommendations made for the Turkish Ministry of Defense. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
This research is primarily concerned with answering the question: Is 
Performance-Based Service Contracting an appropriate procurement concept to support 
Turkey Ministry of Defense operations? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are the expected outcomes and objectives of PBSC? 
• What are the challenges of PBSC? 
• What implementation issues and barriers must be addressed to implement 
PBSC in Turkish defense activities? 
D. PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
This Professional MBA Report analyzes the PBSC concept and its applicability in 
Turkey. The report looks at the basic features of this concept, as well as the background 
and problems stemming from its implementation.  
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Chapter II focuses on the background and history of PBSC. With the help of the 
literature review, the core idea behind this procurement method is revealed. To identify 
and understand clearly this concept, the literature review involves Internet search, reports, 
academic works and review of more than forty articles related to performance-based 
contracting. The historical development, expected outcome and objective of this 
acquisition concept are also discussed. 
Chapter III describes current implementations of PBSC in the United States. This 
chapter focuses on U.S. federal rules and regulations related to PBSC and the contract 
management process for the performance-based contract. Every step taken in the 
performance-based contract management process is described and clarified. Chapter III 
also presents benefits and challenges of PBSC. This chapter states what implementation 
issues and barriers must be addressed to make PBSC successful. It is very important to 
reach a clear decision in this chapter, because the recommendation and conclusion are 
based on its findings. 
Chapter IV focuses on the current Turkish Ministry of Defense service acquisition 
environment. This chapter determines which service type is used by MOD and any 
barriers or policies that prevent use of this concept. The current service acquisition 
process in Turkey is discussed in detail. 
Chapter V presents the recommendation to the Turkish Ministry of Defense for 
the implementation of Performance-Based Service Contracting. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This report uses qualitative research technique to focus on understanding all 
aspects of PBSC. The information gathered provides a deeper understanding of this 
procurement concept and is used to generate recommendations for the Turkish Ministry 
of Defense. The following methods are used: 
• A search of current U.S. federal rules and regulations related to PBSC on 
the Internet 
• A review of Executive orders, guidance polices and GAO reports related 
to PBSC 
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• A review of the research available in the library, as well as articles and 
acquisition magazines 
• A search of Defense Acquisition University and Acquisition Central 
websites to understand the contract management process for the 
performance-based contract 
• Development of conclusions and recommendations based upon analyses of 
all documents and findings 
• A search of the current Turkish rules and regulations related to service 
acquisition on the Internet. 
F. SUMMARY 
Performance-Based Service Contracting is not only a solution for commercial 
firms but also for government agencies. Day by day, use of PBSC is increasing in the 
government sector and defense activities. PBSC can be used to procure a wide range of 
services that touch almost all of the department’s activities, including health care, support 
to intelligence activities, contracting support, management and administrative services, 
weapons and equipment maintenance and communication support. It is a primary tool 
used in the United States to ensure that the federal government gets best value for the 
taxpayers’ money and obtains quality services in a cost-efficient and effective way when 
outsourcing.  
Service procurement is used to support Turkish Ministry of Defense activities, but 
PBSC is unknown in Turkey. It is projected that, in the future, the Ministry of Defense 
will outsource most of the service requirements from private sector. In parallel with 
current trends in the world, PBSC will become an important tool to assure that taxpayers 
are receiving the best value for the service purchased in the Turkish procurement 
environment. The following chapters of this research focus on PBSC and analyze its 
benefits and challenges. The current Turkish procurement environment and regulations 
are also analyzed to reveal potential barriers if PBSC is implemented in Turkey.  The 
following chapters help answer the question: Is Performance-Based Service Contracting 
an appropriate procurement concept to support Turkey’s Ministry of Defense operations? 
 6
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In the current DoD procurement environment, PBSC officially has been a hot 
issue on the agenda since April 1991, when the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
(OFPP) issued Letter 91-2 on service contracting. OFPP Policy Letter 91-2 established 
the policy of utilizing a performance-based approach to service contracting. Following 
that, Garrett (2005) stated,  
Performance-based acquisition is no longer an option—it is a business 
necessity in both public and private business sector. The U.S. federal 
government had mandated that agencies and departments comply with 
performance-based guidelines and requirements, pursuant to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and specific agency policies. (p. 42)  
Following OFPP Letter 91-2, the Performance-Based Acquisition concept was 
further strengthened by legislation passed in the 1990s, such as the Government 
Performance Results Act of 1993, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 
1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, commonly referred to as the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act, or FARA. Recently, the Services Acquisition Reform Act 
(SARA) (Title XIV of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act) was passed; all 
these reforms share the goal of paying taxpayer dollars only for successful performance. 
The main goal of this concept is to get best value in response to taxpayer dollars spent, by 
focusing on the result of the contracting rather than on the process. This approach 
brought PBSC to center stage in service acquisition and made it a major emphasis within 
the federal procurement environment. 
According to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (1998): 
Performance-Based Service Contracting (PBSC) emphasizes that all 
aspects of an acquisition be structured around the purpose of the work to 
be performed as opposed to the manner in which the work is to be 
performed or broad, imprecise statements of work which preclude an 
objective assessment of contractor performance. It is designed to ensure 




Government's performance objectives that appropriate performance 
quality levels are achieved, and that payment is made only for services 
that meet these levels. (p. 4) 
Although two decades have passed since the federal government officially 
mandated performance-based contracting as an efficient means of procurement, 
confusion remains about this concept. Researchers and procurement authorities do not 
have common ground about the definition and implementation of this concept, a fact 
borne out by reports and reviews documenting implementation problems. For example, 
the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report (2008) stated,  
Over the past several years, we have found that if agency service 
acquisitions, including those that are performance-based, are not 
appropriately planned, structured, and monitored, there is an increased risk 
that the government may receive products or services that are over budget, 
delivered late, and of unacceptable quality. (p. 1)  
The GAO (2008) also stated,  
Over the last decade, the use of federal service contracting has increased 
and now accounts for over 60 percent of federal procurement dollars spent 
annually. GAO work has found that if acquisitions are not appropriately 
planned, structured, and monitored, there is an increased risk that the 
services provided will not fulfill intended acquisition outcomes or, 
ultimately, meet agency needs. (p. 5)  
That is why, for the procurement workforce, it is very important to understand PBSC, 
which defines measurable performance expectations in terms of outcomes or results as 
opposed to directing performance methods or work. The purpose of this literature review 
is to explore the prior study of PBSC. This chapter describes the literature relevant to 
PBSC within the federal government, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
objectives that are established for PBSCs. This chapter includes basic definitions, a 
description of law and public policies, a synopsis of regulations, DoD guidance, and 
previous article and findings conducted by the researchers.  
B. DEFINITIONS, LAW AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS IN THE U.S. 
Performance-Based Service Contracting has been in place more than twenty years 
in the federal procurement environment and, over the years, it has been the preferred 
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procurement method to acquire services from the private sector. But it is difficult to 
choose a simple definition of PBSC. There are numerous definitions and sometimes they 
are different from each other. It is essential to define PBSC clearly, since it has 
transformed so dramatically the nature of service delivery. PBSC has many benefits, such 
as alleviating the responsibility of government and shifting risk to the contractors. The 
procurement workforce should master this concept in order to gain the utmost benefits 
from it.  
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s Guide to Best Practices for 
Performance-Based Service Contracting (1998) states, 
Performance-based service contracting (PBSC) emphasizes that all aspects 
of an acquisition be structured around the purpose of the work to be 
performed as opposed to the manner in which the work is to be performed 
or broad, imprecise statements of work which preclude an objective 
assessment of contractor performance. It is designed to ensure that 
contractors are given freedom to determine how to meet the Government's 
performance objectives that appropriate performance quality levels are 
achieved, and that payment is made only for services that meet these 
levels. (p. 5) 
The Department of Defense’s “Guidebook for Performance-Based Services 
Acquisition (PBSC) in the Department of Defense,” dated December 2005 defines PBSC 
as  
acquisition methods and techniques that describe and communicate 
measurable outcomes rather than direct performance processes. It is 
structured around defining a service requirement in terms of performance 
objectives. Simply put, it is a method for acquiring and placing 
responsibility for how it is accomplished on the contractor. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 37.102 states that performance-based 
acquisition (see subpart 37.6) is the preferred method for acquiring services (Public Law 
106-398, section 821). FAR subpart 37.6 indicates that Performance-Based Contracts for 
services shall include: 
• A performance work statement (PWS) 
• Measurable performance standards (i.e., in terms of quality, timeliness, 
quantity, etc.) and the method of assessing contractor performance against 
performance standards 
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• Performance incentives where appropriate. When used, the performance 
incentives shall correspond to the performance standards set forth in the 
contract (see 16.402-2) 
As clearly seen above, FAR Part 37.6 sets forth criteria for the minimum 
mandatory requirements for performance-based acquisition. McClure & Kennedy (2005) 
explained and defined these criteria in their research. They stated that,  
to meet these criteria for ’performance-based,’ a contract should include 
the following essential elements part: 
Performance Work Statement (PWS): Describes the requirements in 
terms of measurable results or delineation of explicit objectives rather than 
by detailed prescriptive methods. 
Performance Measurement Factors/Standards (PMFs): Criteria and 
related performance metrics by which to determine whether performance 
outcomes have been met; defining what is considered ’acceptable 
performance.’ 
Incentives, Disincentives or Penalties: While not mandatory, incentives 
should be used, as appropriate, to encourage performance that will exceed 
the required performance standards. Penalties and incentives complement 
each other. Disincentives are contract provisions or penalties that address 
how to manage performance that does not meet established performance 
standards. 
Quality Assurance Plan (QAP): Methodology for determining how 
contractor performance will be measured and assessed against established 
objective performance standards. (p. 18) 
The definitions above are the official current definition of Performance-Based 
Service Contracting. Before these definitions were established, researchers and 
acquisition experts tried to define PBSC and clarify its basic features. The followings are 
the most well known studies about this topic. 
Eggers (1997) stated that  
Performance contracts clearly spell out the desired end result expected of 
the contractor, but the manner in which the work is to perform is left to the 
contractor's discretion. Contractors are given as much freedom as possible 
in figuring out how to best meet government's performance objective. By 
measuring a contractor's performance against a clear standard, 
performance contracting shifts the emphasis from a focus on process to a 
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focus on product. Government's management role changes from 
prescribing and monitoring inputs to collecting and generating the results 
based data needed to measure the impact of the work performed. (p. 2) 
Martin (2002) claimed that there is no uniform definition of PBSC and proposed a 
comprehensive definition that would encompass all approaches. In his work, he examined 
the commonly used definition of PBSC and made a comprehensive definition of it. His 
findings and explanation about PBSC are stated below: 
PBSC represents one of those interesting phenomenon that arise from time 
to time in public procurement, where practice is outpacing theory. 
Consequently, no commonly agreed upon definition of performance-based 
contracting exists. To fill the void, several public procurement 
organizations have proposed working definitions of PBSC. For example, 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) defines performance-
based contracting as an approach where the statement of work is based on 
“objective, measurable performance standards outputs” (OFPP, 1998, p. 
5). In a related policy memorandum addressed to federal procurement 
officials, the OFPP provides further guidance stating that a performance-
based contract contains “performance standards (i.e., quality, quantity, 
timeliness)” (OFPP, 1997, p. 2). The Department of Defense (DoD), 
which contracts for more services than any other federal department or 
agency, defines a performance-based contract as one that “describes the 
requirements in terms of measurable outcomes rather than by means of 
prescriptive methods” (DoD, 2000, p. 1). The National Association of 
State Purchasing Officials (NASPO) has also joined in with its own 
working definition. According to NASPO, performance-based contracting 
is characterized by, “specification of the outcome expectations of the 
contract and the requirement that any renewals or extensions be based on 
the achievement of the identified outcomes” (NASPO, 1997, p. 120) 
(emphasis added in all quotations). While not made explicit in these 
definitions, the implicit assumption in all of them is that contractor 
compensation, in part or in total, may also be tied to performance.  
The various working definitions of performance-based contracting that 
have been proposed may appear at odds with one another, particularly 
given their various emphasis on: outputs, quality, quantity, timeliness, and 
outcomes. In reality, however, a great deal of commonality exists. One can 
argue that these various definitions, rather than saying different things, are 
merely saying the same thing differently. All the proposed definitions 
have a similar perspective: they attempt to move service contracting away 
from its historical reliance on input and process design specifications 
(telling contractors how to perform the work) in favor of output, quality 
and outcome performance specifications (telling contractors what is 
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expected and leaving the how-to up to them). By allowing contractors to 
determine how best to accomplish the work, performance-based 
contracting strives to increase creativity and innovation in government 
service delivery.  
By building upon the various definitions that have been proposed, a 
consensus definition of PBSC can be derived. A performance-based 
contract can be defined as one that “focuses on the outputs, quality and 
outcomes of service provision and may tie at least a portion of a 
contractor’s payment as well as any contract extension or renewal to their 
achievement” (Martin, 1999b, p. 8). This consensus definition has several 
advantages. It is expansive, rather than restrictive, by suggesting that 
performance-based contracting can involve outputs, quality, outcomes or 
any combination thereof. This consensus definition is also compatible with 
the Government Performance & Results Act (GPRA) at the federal level 
as well as the Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) reporting 
initiative of the governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB, 1994) 
at the state and local government levels. Because this consensus definition 
is compatible with GASB’s SEA reporting, it is also compatible with most 
state government performance measurement and performance budgeting 
systems (Melkers & Willoughby, 1998). Finally, the consensus definition 
is reflective of the actual performance-based contracting activities of state 
human service agencies. (pp. 56–58) 
There exists some overlap in terminology usage between Performance-Based 
Service Contracting (PBSC) and Performance-Based Service Acquisitions (PBSA). Until 
recently, government official rules and regulation used the term PBSC, while some 
scholars preferred PBSA. In fact, there are differences between these terms. Acquisition 
is a comprehensive that covers all steps, from acquisition planning to contract close out. 
Contracting is only a step in the acquisition cycle. Recently, PBSA has overtaken PBSC 
as the term of choice in the United States public procurement environment.  
Another important issue is that PBSC is not itself a contract type. There is a 
common misperception that Performance-Based Contracting refers to a specific type of 
contract. PBSA is defined in FAR Part 37.6, which does not prefer any type of contract. 
Contract types are mostly used to motivate contractors to perform at an optimal level. 




Jennings & Jackson (2002) defined PBSA as a process that,  
involves strategies, methods, and techniques for acquiring services that 
communicate the desired end result rather than dictating detailed 
performance processes. It is a method for acquiring what is required and 
placing responsibility for how it is accomplished on the contractor. A 
major objective of PBSA is to save money. An added objective is to give 
contractors the freedom to determine how best to meet the government’s 
requirements. This freedom fuels innovation. PBSA results in a contract 
that specifies what is required and makes the contractor responsible for 
determining the best method for accomplishing that end result. (p. 26) 
Moore, Segal, & McMahon (2003) authored many studies and articles on 
privatization, and competitive sourcing areas. Their findings related to PBSC follow: 
One powerful reform that can save government money and improve 
program results is implementing PBSC for as many contracts as possible. 
PBSC is the soliciting of bids based on what results government wants 
accomplished, rather than what activities it wants conducted. In other 
words, the emphasis is on outcomes rather than inputs. This requires 
performance standards to be included in the contract and contractual 
payments tied to the achievement of results.  
The better the performance standards for a given service or activity, the 
easier it will be to monitor the contract effectively. The design of the deal 
makes a lot of difference in the success of monitoring the contractor. 
Because these factors are so interdependent, it is often best to write the 
performance standards and the monitoring plan simultaneously. Indeed, 
the Federal Office of Management and Budget recommends simultaneous 
development of performance measures and monitoring plans as a best 
practice.  
For many agencies, this would mark a significant change in the way of 
doing business. By compensating a contractor for results rather than effort 
or activity, the transaction becomes more efficient for both the vendor and 
government. The vendor has the freedom and flexibility to do what it does 
best (produce the service) without micromanagement by government (p. 
5). 
According to Garrett (2003):  
When a contract is based on performance, all aspects of the acquisition are 
structured around the purpose of the work to be performed, rather than the 
manner in which it is to be done. The government seeks to elicit the best 
performance the private sector has to offer, at a reasonable price or cost, 
by stating its objectives and giving contractors both latitude in determining 
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how to achieve them and incentives for achieving them. In source 
selection, for example, the government might publish a draft solicitation 
for comment, use quality-related evaluation factors, or both. The statement 
of work will provide performance standards, rather than spell out what the 
contractor is to do. The contract normally contains a plan for quality 
assurance surveillance. In addition, the contract typically includes positive 
and negative performance incentives. (p. 14) 
Sanchez (2004) tried to find answers to the question: what is PBSC? In his article, 
he defined PBSC as,  
a process where the end goal is simply stated as the contract requirement. 
What’s left out, or should be left out, is the process of how the contractor 
should get to that goal, product, or result. The effort is meant to allow 
contractors the leeway to use best practices and implement innovations to 
deliver goods or services.  
He also accepts that the four elements stated in FAR 37.6 are the skeletal “must-haves” 
for every PBS contract. According to him, every PBC must define: 
• The requirement in terms of results 
• Measurable performance requirements and how the measurements will be 
done 
• How reductions in fee/price will be taken when performance does not 
meet requirements 
• Incentives (positive and negative if necessary) (Sanchez, 2004, p. 56) 
Boykin (2005) stated that,  
Simply defined, performance-based contracting allows government to 
acquire services via contracts that define what is to be achieved, not 
necessarily how it is done. This creates a boon for government 
procurement, providing best-value products and services and pre-screened 
contractors. In addition, performance-based contracting gives industry the 
freedom to bring new approaches to the government table. The reality of 
performance-based contracting for the government procurement official is 
that responsibilities have not lessened; they have changed, and radically 
so. This move to a solutions-based approach means government no longer 
has to define precisely how the contractor will achieve specified 
objectives. But now, government procurement officials need to be well 
schooled in the methodology for arriving at measurable metrics and 
acceptable quality levels when developing the performance work 
statement (PWS) or statement of objectives (SOO). (p. 6) 
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Garrett (2007) defined PBSC as “a strategic method to manage business 
arrangements by promoting flexibility and innovation and focusing on outcomes, while 
using performance standards, metrics, and incentives to motivate superior results.” (p. 
56). 
Newell (2008) thought that,  
Performance-based acquisition was designed to help agencies reap the 
benefits of private sector innovation. Proponents of the initiative say that 
for years, the government has micromanaged its contracts by spelling out 
every detail of how it wanted goals to be achieved. In the performance-
based approach, an agency says what problem needs to be solved and 
allows contractors to make bids detailing their proposed solutions. The 
agency is charged with developing clear ways to measure the result as well 
as the contractors' performance over the course of the contract. 
Evidence-Based Associates (2010) states on its website:  
A performance-based contract changes the focus from process to 
guaranteed performance. A performance-based contract transfers 
performance risk to the provider. Providers have the freedom to innovate, 
but they are held accountable for the results and performance-based 
contracts have a proven history of reducing program costs and increasing 
desired outcomes. 
To this point, this chapter has discussed scholars’ works and official documents 
related to Performance-Based Service Contracting and Performance-Based Service 
Acquisition. Although it is difficult to make a uniform definition, we can conclude that 
Performance-Based Service Acquisition has unique characteristic that distinguish it from 
traditional procurement methods. Some of the basic features of PBSA are stated below:  
• Focuses on the desired results, the what, not the how 
• Allows contractors to continually modify approach to ensure 
maximum performance 
• Encourages innovation and shifts risk from government to 
contractors 
• Uses incentives and remedies to motivate the highest levels of 
contractor performance 
• Encourages frequent and open communications between the 
government and industry 
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PBSA describes the desired outcome of the process rather than giving a detailed, 
“how to” process the contractor must follow. Describing the requirement in terms of 
desired outcomes gives freedom to the contractor to choose the most efficient way to 
proceed. PBSA is concerned with defining the tasks to be performed by the contractor, 
establishing observable and measurable performance standards in the requirements of the 
contract, and developing a method to assess or survey the contractor’s performance in 
accordance with inspection and acceptance requirements of the contract. PBSA requires 
that agencies tell industry “what” they want accomplished as opposed to “how” to 
accomplish the requirement.  This approach shifts a majority of the risk for successful 
performance from the government to the contractor.  It allows industry to use innovative 
practices and control their ability to make profits based on their performance. PBSA is 
the best way to motivate a contractor to take responsibility for achieving acceptable 
performance. In this concept, contractors are allowed to devote the resources and 
intelligence necessary to make their own ideas work. Moreover, they do not have to stick 
to agency solutions dictated in the statement of work. In contrast, traditional contract 
management enforces the terms of the contract and binds the contractors to the work 
statement. 
PBSA is an acquisition concept structured around the results to be achieved rather 
than the steps to be followed. The essence of PBSA is that the requirement is stated in 
terms of the desired results to the maximum extent possible, and minimizes language that 
tells the contractor how to do the work or how to achieve the result. A PBSA contract has 
four features:   
• Performance Work Statement 
• Measurable performance standards (in terms of quality, timeliness, and 
quantity) 
• A method of assessing contractor performance to the standards 
• Positive and negative performance incentives where appropriate. 
The federal government model for implementing a PBSA is the “Seven Steps to 
Performance-based Services Acquisition.”  This is a proposed model and an excellent 
guide to deal with a performance-based service contract. The model consists of the 
following seven steps: 
 17
• Establish an Integrated Solutions Team 
• Describe the problem that needs solving 
• Examine private-sector and public-sector solutions 
• Develop a PWS or Statement of Objectives (SOO) 
• Decide how to measure and manage performance 
• Select the right contractor 
• Manage performance 
The seven steps are studied in detail in the section on implementation. Objectives 
of PBSA are evaluated in the following section.  
C. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
With the growth of services contracting, government agencies began to explore 
new acquisition techniques in order to obtain services in a better way and focus on results 
rather than processes to get best value. They also wanted to benefit from industry’s 
experience and innovations. Contracting authorities try to find a new way to improve 
flexibility, increase responsiveness, decrease costs, reduce risk and allow the organization 
to focus on their primary functions. The pursuit of new acquisition procedure led to the 
emergence of performance-based contracting. Performance-Based Contracts (PBCs) have 
been around for more than 20 years and have been used to acquire quality goods and 
services. In 1991, the federal government mandated that government agencies use them.  
PBSA is a kind of performance-based contracting method to acquire service from 
the private sector. It was pioneered within the Department of Defense and then expanded 
to the whole government. PBSA officially became a current issue in the federal 
procurement environment after Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Letter 91-
2.  With the release of this policy letter, use of performance-based services acquisition 
has been reinforced at several levels throughout the federal government. Some of the 
researcher findings related history of PBC and PBSA are stated below: 
Arcidiacono (2003) explored PBSA’s history very comprehensively in his Master 
thesis. He found that: 
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The Service Contract Act of 1965 established the Government’s service 
contract labor standards. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
under OMB Circular A- 76 dated 4 August 1983 established the 
Government’s policy to (1) achieve economy and enhance productivity 
through Government/Commercial competition of activity whenever 
permissible, (2) retain Governmental functions in-house, and (3) rely on 
available commercial sources to provide commercial products and 
services. Overarching legislation including the Government Performance 
and Results Act of 1993, The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994, and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 have emphasized that the 
Government must better manage its internal and acquisition processes by 
establishing performance requirements, accurately measuring 
performance, and rewarding and penalizing good and bad performance, 
respectively.  
Much of the historical foundation of performance-based requirements is 
rooted in hardware development and deployment. The Navy’s submarine 
launched ballistic missile and NASA’s space programs are stunning 
examples of performance-based achievement. Since Government 
acquisition has gradually shifted to service acquisition it clearly makes 
good business sense for the Government to apply performance-based 
concepts to service requirements in an attempt to increase service delivery 
efficiency. The Government has reinforced this performance-based 
philosophy through a series of services specific policies and regulations.  
The Office of Federal Procurement and Policy (OFPP) under Policy Letter 
(P.L.) 91-2 dated 9 April 1991 provided a definition of performance-based 
contracting and established the Government’s service contracting policy. 
The Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 97-01 dated 22 August 1997 
implemented OFPP P.L. 91-2 through the amendment of Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Parts 7, 16, 37, 42, 46, and 52 . The most 
critical aspect of the FAC 97-01 amendment was the establishment of 
FAR Subpart 37.6, Performance-Based Contracting. (p.11) 
Edwards & Ralph’s (2006) study found the following related to the history of 
PBSA: 
PBSA, in various manifestations, has a long history. During 1969-1971, 
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare experimented with an outcomes-based approach 
to contracting for educational services. The results were mixed and the 
program was dropped. In September 1979, the Air Force adopted a 
comprehensive performance-based approach to contracting for base 
support services, which OFPP adopted for government-wide use in 
October 1980. The efforts of the Air Force and OFPP produced few, if 
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any, positive results. The 1991 OFPP policy letter was a response to 
growing concerns about the amounts that agencies were spending to buy 
services and the quality of the services they were receiving. However, 
agencies were slow to respond to the policy letter, and although the letter 
called for FAR implementation before the end of 1991, it was not until 
1997 that the FAR was amended to include rules for PBSA. Since 1997, 
agencies have tried to use the technique, but with disappointing results. 
Implementation goals were established, but not achieved.  
Government acquisition officials and industry representatives have 
expressed doubts about the success of PBSA, independent reviews have 
not validated predictions and anecdotal claims of improvements in quality 
and reductions in cost, and people at the working level are frustrated. In 
2001 and 2002, the Honorable Angela Styles, then Administrator of 
OFPP, told Congress that performance-based services acquisition had not 
been more successful because the concept had not been adequately 
defined. In July 2003, an interagency team assembled by OFPP 
recommended minor changes to the FAR, which were published in 
December 2005. (p. 34) 
PBSA became the prime federal procurement method during the Bush 
administration, which emphasized performance as a key focus of its management agenda. 
The President’s Management Agenda, announced in summer 2001, has focused on results 
and made agencies accountable for meeting the goals and delivering the services to the 
taxpayers they serve (Yabusaki, 2008). 
That is why, during the Bush administration, PBSA became the preferred method 
of procuring services from the private sector. The Administration encouraged agencies to 
use this method. According to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, agencies 
increased their PBSA from 26 percent in 2001 to approximately 45 percent of all 
contracts in 2007 (Newell, 2008). 
The important events related to PBSA are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Chronicle of PBSA 
Year Important Events 
1969-71 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare experimented with PBA for educational services; results were mixed 
1979 Air Force adopted performance-based approach for base support service contracts 
1980 Adopted by OFPP for government-wide use 
1991 OFPP Policy Letter 91-2, PBSA preferred method for service contracting 
1993 Government Performance Results Act 
1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act; this Act led to new methods of procurement 
1994 OFPP initiated, in October 1994, a government wide pledge pilot project to encourage the use of PBSA. 
1997 PBA first implemented in the FAR 
2001 Public Law 106-398, Section 821 – Added to the FAR 
2001 
 
OFPP sets Government-wide goal of 50% for use of PBA in eligible service 
contracts by FY 2005 
2002 
 
GAO issues report (GAO-02-1049) finding that documents did not support 
agencies’ claims of having implemented PBA. 
2002 
 




OFPP Head testifies before Congress on agencies’ slow implementation of 
PBA 
2003 House Committee on Government Reform introduced SARA 
2003 OFPP heads Interagency Task Force On PBSA 
2004 
 
OFFP issues policy memo adopting some of the Task Force’s 
recommendations 
2004 OFPP adopted the Seven Steps Guide  
2006 FAR revised to incorporate provisions of OFPP policy memo 
 
Government-wide, the Seven Steps Guide is a very critical tool to implement 
PBSA. By memo on September 7, 2004, OFPP adopted the Seven Steps Guide as the 
"official" guide on this topic. As stated on the Seven Steps official website:  
In 2001, the Department of Commerce established an interagency team to 
write a comprehensive and clear guide to help agencies meet their 
performance-based contracting goals set out by the Procurement 
Executives' Council. Agencies represented on the team were Agriculture, 
Commerce, Defense, GSA, and Treasury; the team was supported by 
Acquisition Solutions®, Inc., and with their help, the guide was placed on 
the Internet. The General Services Administration took responsibility for 
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the project in 2003, and they continue to manage the Seven Steps web site. 
OFPP is leading a broader-based interagency team in managing the 
content of the Seven Steps guide, along with working towards meeting the 
2006 SARA Panel recommendations. Acquisition Solutions® continues to 
provide support. (Acquisition Central, 2006) 
We can conclude that Performance-Based Service Acquisition was used for the 
first time between 1969 and 1971 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
In the DoD environment, the Air Force adopted the performance-based approach for base 
support service contracts in 1979. During the 1980s, PBSA had reached Government-
wide use and finally become an obligation and preferred method for service contracting 
after 1991, when OFPP Policy Letter 91-2 was released. This policy letter was issued in 
response to a growing concern that most of the government work was being procured 
from private markets. During the Bush administration, PBSA became the preferred 
method of procuring services, with yearly Executive Orders setting PBSA performance 
goals to continue to motivate agencies to use the PBSA strategy on eligible service 
actions. According to the last order, released on  December 5, 2007, the Fiscal Year 2008 
Performance-Based Acquisition Performance Goal was increased from 45 percent to 50 
percent. 
The growth in performance-based acquisitions brought some problems. Some 
agencies fell behind the initiative’s goals due to lack of training. Resistance to the change 
in culture also played a role. PBSA was very new and totally different from traditional 
concepts. The acquisition workforce needed training about this new procurement concept. 
That is why OFPP adopted the Seven Steps Guide as the "official" guide on this issue. 
This guide was adopted to help agencies reach the goal laid out by the Administration. 
PBSA has now been used more than twenty years as an effective tool to acquire services 
in the United States. There are some challenges and problems stemming from 
implementation and the contract management process. These are mentioned in following 
chapters. 
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D. OBJECTIVES OF PERFORMANCE-BASED SERVICE ACQUISITION 
The GAO (2008) stated that, “Over the last decade, the use of federal service 
contracting has increased and now accounts for over 60 percent of federal procurement 
dollars spent annually” (p. 5). In the DoD, 53 percent of contract spending is for service 
acquisition. But we cannot say that the federal government gets the best value in every 
service contract. In service acquisition, the main objective is to get the right service, at 
the right time and in the right manner. The services obtained should meet cost, schedule, 
and performance requirements. If PBSA is successfully implemented it can help improve 
service acquisition outcomes and ensure that the services obtained meet cost, schedule, 
and performance requirements. This is because PBSA describes outcome-oriented 
requirements, measurable performance standards, and quality assurance surveillance 
plans.  
According to the FAR, the principal objective of PBSA is to express government 
needs in terms of required performance objectives, rather than the method of 
performance, to encourage industry-driven, competitive solutions. Other important 
objectives of PBSA were stated by the DoD in 2000. DoD emphasized that, by describing 
requirements in terms of outcomes, agencies can help achieve the following objectives. 
1. Maximize Performance  
Performance-Based Service Acquisition focuses on the outputs, quality and end 
result. Payment and other incentives are tied to contractors’ performance. PBSA clearly 
spells out what is expected of the contractor, but the method in which the work is to be 
performed is left to the contractor’s choice. This contract approach lets the contractor 
deliver service by following its own best practices and solutions. Contractors focus on 
their own processes rather than following the government agency’s orders.  
2. Maximize Competition and Innovation  
PBSA was developed to benefit from private sector innovation. In the traditional 
procurement approach, the government spells out every detail of how it wants its goals to 
be achieved. In the performance-based approach, an agency says what problem needs to 
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be solved and allows contractors to propose their solutions. The contractors have the 
freedom and flexibility to come up with the best possible solution to meet the agency’s 
need. The agency is charged with describing clear objectives and desired outcomes to 
measure the contractors' performance. In this way, innovation and industry experience are 
allowed to flourish by the agencies. 
3. Encourage and Promote the Use of Commercial Services  
The vast majority of service requirements are commercial in nature. Use of 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 (Acquisition of Commercial Items) 
procedures provides great benefits by minimizing the reporting burden and reducing the 
use of government-unique contract clauses and similar requirements, which can help 
attract a broader industry base. 
4. Shift in Risk   
Performance-based contracts allow for better government control over contractors 
and greater assurances of accountability. The traditional contracts focus on procedures 
and process, which is why most of the quality assurance evaluator (QAE), contracting 
officer’s representative (COR), or contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR) 
cannot oversee the contract properly. PBSA allows the performance assessment 
personnel to focus on end results and outcomes. When contractors become responsible 
for achieving the objectives in the work statement through the use of their own best 
practices and processes, much of the risk is shifted from the government to industry. 
5. Achieve Savings  
PBSA is considered to be the most cost-effective acquisition method because 
contractors are held accountable for the desired result and paid according to their 
performance. Most of the service requirements are commercial in nature, leading to 
maximum competition. 
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E. SUMMARY  
In the United States, most of the government departments outsource some 
services to perform their mission. The private sector provides a wide range of services 
including health care, support to intelligence activities, contracting support, and various 
professional, base support, communication support, interrogators, security, engineering 
support, and administrative support. Although service acquisition is used commonly in 
the federal environment, it is not always possible to get the best value for the taxpayers’ 
money and obtain quality services. All contracts have risk that the government may 
receive products or services that are over budget, delivered late and of unacceptable 
quality. To deal with these kinds of problems, Performance-Based Service Contracting 
was developed. In the United States, PBSC has been the preferred method for procuring 
services from the private sector for the last twenty years. Since the mid-1990s, the current 
term for service acquisition is Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA). 
PBSA describes the desired outcome of the process rather than giving a detailed, 
“how to” process the contractor must follow. Describing the requirement in terms of 
desired outcomes give freedom to the contractor to choose the most efficient way to 
achieve desired outcome. PBSA is concerned with defining the tasks to be performed by 
the contractor, establishing observable and measurable performance standards in the 
requirements of the contract, and developing a method to assess the contractor’s 
performance in accordance with inspection and acceptance requirements of the contract. 
The PBSA process requires that agency tell industry “what” it wants accomplished as 
opposed to “how” to accomplish the requirement.  This approach shifts a majority of the 
risk for successful performance from the government to the contractor.  It allows industry 
to use innovative practices and control their ability to make profits based on their 
performance.  PBSA is the best way to motivate a contractor to take responsibility for 
achieving acceptable performance.  
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As the literature clearly shows, PBSC/PBSA has many advantages and some 
challenges. It has been used more than twenty years and until now any common and 
accepted definition could not be made. That is why it is obvious that some 
implementation problems and challenges can stem from this contracting method. The 
following chapters focus on implementation of PBSA in the United States and analyze 
the benefits and challenges of PBSA. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION, BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Performance-Based Service Contracting is the preferred method when procuring 
service in the United States. 
The most important part of every system or process is the implementation or 
operation step. With the help of the implementation and operation process, we can easily 
identify the pros and cons of the system or the process. An excellent solution in theory 
may be total failure in practice. This rule is valid for the public procurement process. 
Sometimes enacted regulation by the parliament or senate is not practicable and causes 
unpredictable problems. Implementing a system that belongs to another legal system or 
culture in our own system needs careful study since every country has unique 
characteristics and regulations that can form obstacles.  The purpose of this chapter 
discuss how the United States contracting authorities carry out PBSC when they procure 
service from the private sector and identify benefits and challenges. 
This chapter describes current implementations of PBSC in the United States and 
clarifies every step taken in the PBSC management process. Benefits and challenges of 
PBSC are discussed in detail in this part. This chapter also highlights important issues 
and problems to address in order to ensure the process operates smoothly. These issues 
help in comparison between the public procurement processes of the United States and 
Turkey.  
B. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DOD ENVIRONMENT 
In the United States, federal service contracting accounts for 60 percent of federal 
procurement dollars spent. It is very important to get best value from this service 
contract. GAO has found that if acquisitions are not appropriately planned and monitored, 
the risk of over cost, schedule delays and poor performance will be high (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 5). To deal with this kind of risk, PBSA was 
developed but this acquisition concept has not been fully implemented government-wide  
 
 28
for a variety of reasons, including lack of knowledge and cultural resistance to changes. 
To overcome these problems, OFPP adopted the Seven Steps Guide as the "official" 
guide on PBSA.  
 
Figure 1.   Seven Steps to Performance-Based Service Acquisition 
The purpose of this guide is to assist agencies in implementing PBSA. The steps 
are logical and easy to understand, each building on the previous, and they provide 
guidance to agencies that enables them to move forward in this new paradigm. Although 
the Seven Steps Guide was written to enable and promote performance-based service 
acquisitions (PBSA), the processes and methodologies described in the Guide apply to all 
acquisitions in the current federal environment. The Seven Steps provide a framework for 
understanding performance-based services acquisition—and were conceived with the 
purpose of educating the greater "acquisition community," including the program 
managers, program staff, customers, and others whose participation is vital to a 
successful performance-based acquisition. This guide describes performance-based 
service acquisition using seven steps. The seven steps are described below: 
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1. Establish An Integrated Solutions Team 
An Integrated Solution Team must be established. This team should assist in the 
acquisition planning, solicitation development, evaluation, and award phase of the 
acquisition. Senior management and different experts from the organization, empowered 
to make decisions within their area of responsibility, should be involved in this team to 
make acquisition successful. Roles and responsibilities of each member of the team 
should be defined. Members of the team should know the customer’s needs, interests, 
objectives, and possible objections. The Integrated Solutions Team is responsible to 
assure that the acquisition program satisfies legal and regulatory requirements, meets the 
agency's intended results, is consistent with the agency's strategic goals and remains on 
schedule and within budget. After contract award, the PBSA team will be closely 
involved in the surveillance of the resulting contractor’s performance. 
2. Describe the Problem That Needs Solving 
The function of any service acquisition is to support and improve an agency’s 
performance goals and objectives. That is why the clear description of the problem that 
needs to be solved should be made in this stage. The Integrated Solutions Team should 
focus on what outcome is required rather than what resources are required. The ultimate 
intended result of the contract should be decided and linked to the agency’s mission 
needs.   
Because these are important to establish a clear target for success, which 
will then serve to focus the efforts of the integrated solutions team in 
crafting the acquisition, the contractors in competing for award and the 
government-industry team throughout contract performance.  (Acquisition 
Central, 2006) 
3. Examine Private Sector and Public Sector Solutions 
Once the acquisition’s intended results have been identified, the Integrated 
Solutions Team (IST) should begin to examine both private sector and public sector 
solutions. This is called “market research,” and it is a vital means of arming the team with 
the expertise needed to conduct an effective performance-based acquisition. Market 
research is the continuous process of collecting information to maximize reliance on the 
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commercial marketplace and to benefit from its capabilities, technologies, and 
competitive forces in meeting an agency need. Market research is essential to the 
government’s ability to buy best-value products and services that solve mission-critical 
problems. Acquisition reform has opened the door to effective new approaches to market 
research that should be undertaken by the Integrated Solutions Team long before 
attempting to write a performance work statement.  Market research is a good source for 
finding the appropriate contract type to fit a specific situation. The PBSA team can utilize 
negotiations with the contractor to determine the right contract type.  
4. Develop Performance Work Statement or a Statement of Objectives  
In the previous three steps, the Integrated Solutions Team has determined the 
agency needs and conducted market research. Now, the Integrated Solutions Team has 
the knowledge and expertise to state the specification for service acquisition. There are 
two ways to develop a specification for a performance-based service acquisition. One of 
them is a performance work statement (PWS) and the other one is a statement of 
objectives (SOO).  
a. Performance Work Statement (PWS) 
According to Compton (2010): 
The performance work statement (PWS) describes contract work in terms 
of the required outcome or result. It does not describe the manner in which 
work is to be performed. A PWS is intended to allow vendors the freedom 
to be creative and innovative in determining how best to meet the 
government’s objectives. The PWS process is discussed in most existing 
guides on performance-based acquisition. Among its key processes are the 
conduct of a job analysis and development of a performance work 
statement and quality assurance and surveillance plan. (p. 75)  
The beginning of preparing the PWS starts with the analytical process, 
which is generally referred to as the job analysis. This is where we examine the agency’s 
requirement and it tends to be a bottom-up assessment. Once we perform this task, it 
forms the basis for establishing performance requirements, developing performance 
standards, writing the PWS and producing the QASP. DoD uses another analytical 
process, which is described in detail in their PBSA Guidebook, wherein they define the 
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desired outcomes, conduct an outcome analysis, and conduct a performance analysis. In 
this step, the most important job of the Integrated Solutions Team is to develop certain 
information such as a description of the requirement in terms of results or outcomes, 
measurable performance standards and acceptable quality levels (AQLs). Once all the 
information is gathered, the IST should compile the information in the performance 
matrix, which will include desired outcomes, required services, performance standards, 
AQL, monitoring methods and Incentives/Disincentives. There is not a standard format 
for writing a PWS.  The FAR only requires describing requirements in terms of results 
rather than the process, using measurable performance standards and QASP, providing 
for reductions of fees or price, and including performance incentives where appropriate. 
OFPP’s guide says that the key elements of a PWS are the statement of the required 
services in terms of output, measurable performance standard for the output and an AQL 
or allowable error rate.    
b. Statement of Objectives (SOO)  
An alternative way to development of the PWS is to develop a statement 
of objectives. SOO is a more recent methodology that turns the acquisition 
process around and requires competing contractors to develop the 
performance work statement, performance metrics and measurement plan, 
and quality assurance plan” (Acquisition Central, 2006). FAR part 2.1 
defines the statement of objective as follows: “Statement of Objectives 
(SOO) means a government-prepared document incorporated into the 
solicitation that states the overall performance objectives. It is used in 
solicitations when the government intends to provide the maximum 
flexibility to each offeror to propose an innovative approach.  
The Department of Defense (1999) briefly described the SOO approach in 
the “Handbook Guidance for Acquisition of Training Data Products and Services.” 
According to this Handbook,  
The SOO is a Government prepared document incorporated into the RFP 
that states the overall RFP objectives. It is provided in the RFP instead of 
a Government written SOW. SOO can be used to provide the maximum 
flexibility to each Offeror to propose an innovative development approach 
to satisfy the objectives. Offerors use the RFP, product performance 
requirements, and SOO as a basis for preparing their proposals, which will 
include a SOW. SOO should provide the basic, top level objectives of the 
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acquisition. This approach provides potential offerors the flexibility to 
develop cost effective solutions and the opportunity to propose innovative 
alternatives meeting the stated objectives. It also presents the Government 
with an opportunity to assess the offeror’s understanding of all aspects of 
the effort to be performed. (p. 2)  
The content of the SOO is clearly stated in the FAR. FAR37.602(c) 
requires agencies to include, at minimum, the following elements in an SOO:  Purpose, 
Scope or mission, Period and place of performance, Background, Performance objectives 
and Any operating constraints. 
Compton (2010) found the following about the SOO:  
When the government decides to ask proposing vendors to develop 
innovative solutions for its requirements, it develops and issues an SOO 
with the solicitation. A SOO is normally used when the government does 
not have enough information on the type of supplies and services it needs.  
SOO describes the desired results of the acquisition in terms of objective 
and how those objectives relate to the mission of the federal agency that 
developed it. The SOO is brief, so it does not fully describe the desired 
results. Then, based on the SOO, the proposing vendors must develop 
solutions for the government’s objectives. Because the vendors are guided 
only by overall performance objectives, they are free to devise an 
innovative approach to meeting the needs of the government. In short, 
instead of the government describing in detail the work to be 
accomplished, the vendors propose detailed options and solutions. These 
options and solutions become the government’s PWS. SOO may not be 
made a part of the contract. It must be removed from the solicitation and 
replaced with the PWS prepared by the winning vendor upon award of the 
contract. (p. 79) 
5. Decide How to Measure and Manage Performance 
In most cases, the success of an acquisition is based on the management of the 
contract. To manage a contract successfully, some plan and measurement techniques are 
essential. The Seven Step Guide states that, “Developing an approach to measuring and 
managing performance is a complex process that requires consideration of many factors: 
performance standards and measurement techniques, performance management approach, 
incentives, and more. This component of performance-based acquisition is as important 
as developing the Statement of Work (SOW) or the Statement of Objectives (SOO), 
because this step establishes the strategy of managing the contract to achieve planned 
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performance objectives.” One of the most important tools to manage contractor 
performance is the Quality Assurance Plan. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
(1998) stated that, “The QAP defines what the government must do to ensure that the 
contractor has performed in accordance with the PWS performance standards. This can 
range from a one-time inspection of a product or service to periodic in-process 
inspections of on-going product or service delivery. It is needed to ensure the government 
receives the quality of services called for under the contract, and pays only for the 
acceptable level of services received. Since the QAP is intended to measure performance 
against standards in the PWS, these interdependent documents must be coordinated. 
Accordingly, writing the two documents simultaneously is both effective and efficient.” 
McGregor and Jaggers (2005) gave valuable information about QAP in their 
research project. Their findings are as follow:  
Moreover, a QAP or QASP is a plan for which the Government QAE 
measures the contractor’s performance against the standards contained in 
the PWS. This plan should be clear, concise, and inform the contractor 
what surveillance methods will be employed in any resulting contract. The 
QASP should focus on the critical tasks contained in the PWS, which are 
measurable and attainable. It tells the contractor how they will be paid for 
services rendered to ensure the Government receives the services required. 
Consequently, the QASP provides the Government with an indication of 
what resources are needed to properly administer and assess the 
contractor’s performance. Even so, the contractor should not rely solely on 
the QASP to tell them how to perform any required services. In 
developing the QASP, the Government team should look at the PWS and 
decide which tasks are critical and worth measuring. It is better to choose 
fewer metrics which are meaningful and relevant than to select numerous 
or complex metrics. When selecting the metrics, the team should look at 
the metrics to ensure they are easy to collect. If not, they may not be 
achievable and are not worth being selected as a metric. To be achievable 
means the contractor will not require any assistance from Government 
personnel to provide the required services. (p. 15) 
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Compton (2010) stated,  
When a solicitation uses a SOO, and the government wants vendors to 
develop the work performance standards and quality assurance plan, it 
must request this in the solicitation. In almost all cases, vendor’s quality 
standards will meet the government’s expectations. Using the SOO 
approach gives vendors the flexibility and freedom to develop 
performance standards and business practices. The vendors can also easily 
describe how their performance should be monitored and their work 
results evaluated. (p. 82)  
6. Selecting the Right Contractor 
This step involves developing an acquisition strategy that will lead to selection of 
the right contractor who provides the best value for the desired service. One important 
factor in selecting the right contractor is to describe the problem that needs to be solved. 
The other important factor is that all the offerors have adequate information about the 
requirements and performance-based strategy. That is why communication with offerors 
is an important element of selecting the right contractor.  The IST team has to understand 
every proposed solution to assess the associated risks and likelihood of success and do 
the best-value tradeoff analysis.  According to the FAR, “Best value means the expected 
outcome of an acquisition that, in the government’s estimation, provides the greatest 
overall benefit in response to the requirement.” The Seven Steps to PBSA Guide’s (2005) 
explanation of best value concept is that, “Best value is a process used to select the most 
advantageous offer by evaluating and comparing factors in addition to cost or price. It 
allows flexibility in selection through tradeoffs which the agency makes between the cost 
and non-cost evaluation factors with the intent of awarding to the contractor.” The 
selected contractor may not provide the lowest price, but may offer a better solution to 
the government. When evaluating each proposal, the IST team must be aware that each 
offeror must understand the performance-based approach, know the agency's 
requirement, have a past performance history and have the processes and resources to 
support the mission and meet the requirements.  
Source selecting process will be very important when government uses SOO 
instead of PWS.  PWS is used when the government needs are well defined and the 
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required services have been clearly determined. If government uses PWS it means that 
the government determines its requirements and outcomes, defines the tasks to be 
accomplished and develops standards. Based on these, the government can easily 
evaluate the proposals and determine which one provides best value. The government 
uses SOO when commercial industry has expertise in providing the service or the 
government does not have expertise in the required service area. When using a SOO, the 
Offeror, not the government, will write the PWS. A SOO provides the maximum 
flexibility to each Offeror to propose an innovative development approach in their unique 
and self-created PWS. The Integrated Solution Team must evaluate all proposed 
Performance Work Statements to determine acceptability and compatibility. It is 
important to evaluate all factors in a detailed manner that needs more time and skilled 
contracting personnel. That is why selecting the right contractor is more difficult and time 
consuming when government uses SOO instead of PWS. 
A contractor’s past performance record is the key indicator for predicting future 
performance. Past performance records are very useful to evaluate and select the proposal 
that provides best value. As stated in the Seven Steps to PBSA Guide (2005): “Evaluation 
of past performance is particularly important for service contracts. Properly conducted, 
the collection and use of such information provides significant benefits. It enhances the 
government’s ability to predict both the performance quality and customer satisfaction. It 
also provides a powerful incentive for current contractors to maximize performance and 
customer satisfaction.” In summary, developing a successful acquisition strategy is 
necessary to solve many potential problems at the beginning. A successful acquisition 
strategy involves describing the problem, clear communication with offerors, evaluating 
past performance and making a best-value source selection decision.  
7. Manage the Contractor’s Performance 
As stated in GAO’s (2006) report, service acquisition differs from product 
acquisition in several aspects and needs close and detailed control of contractor 
performance. The success of the acquisition is largely based on the management of the 
contract. Contract management is vital because government’s agencies rely on the private 
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sector to achieve their goals. If they do not get the right service at the right time and the 
right place they will not function properly. That is why agencies should allocate sufficient 
resources to ensure the contractor performs in accordance with PWS.  
The role of the Integrated Solution Team does not end with the award of a 
contract. Team members’ involvement throughout contract implementation and closeout 
is critical to ensure that contracted services are delivered according to the schedule, cost, 
quality, and quantity specified in the contract. They have to ensure that the contract 
performance is consistent with the description and scope of the contract (Walker, 2008, p. 
9). 
At this stage, a properly trained workforce in sufficient numbers is critical to 
monitor contractor performance effectively. If monitoring is not conducted sufficiently, 
the agency cannot identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. 
The contractor’s performance assessment is done by the quality assurance evaluator 
(QAE), contracting officer’s representative (COR), or contracting officer’s technical 
representative (COTR). These have different names but their duties are generally the 
same. They assess contractor performance against contract performance standards on the 
site. All these personnel are responsible for knowing the current, most efficient and 
effective performance assessment methods and techniques. In most cases, contracting 
officer’s representative (COR) is responsible for doing contractor’s performance 
assessment. To fulfill this responsibility COR should be qualified and should maintain 
accurate documentation and a clear communication with the contractors. (Maddox, 1999, 
p. 9-2) 
Mutual trust and clear communication are also critical to make the contract work. 
Without trust and clear communication, innovation and improvements in the service will 
not happen.  The members of the Integrated Solution Team should know the terms and 
conditions of the contract, the PWS, their responsibilities and authorities to avoid any 
unauthorized actions and to be sure that the Contractor’s performance conforms to the 
terms and conditions of the contract, the PWS. 
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C. BENEFITS OF PERFORMANCE-BASED SERVICE ACQUISITION 
The aim of the service acquisition is to obtain the right service, at the right price, 
in the right way and from the right supplier. This point is very important today, as the 
federal government outsources more goods and service to carry out its operations. There 
are different methods to reach this goal. The Performance-Based Service Acquisition is 
not a perfect solution but is a preferred acquisition method when getting service in the 
federal acquisition environment. It has been used for more than twenty years and 
mandated for federal service acquisition. Naturally, as with every system or process, it 
has benefits and challenges. In some cases, it is a convenient tool to get best value for 
taxpayer money. But in some cases it is too difficult to implement this acquisition 
concept.  
Scholars have noted that there are many other reasons that federal government 
agencies use PBSA, with its benefits and better solution. The Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (1998) study on performance-based contracts for service acquisition 
showed that benefits including reduced acquisition cost, increased competition for 
contracts and improved contractors performance had been achieved. One important 
benefit of PBSA is to enable government to pay contractors based on outcomes and 
performance rather than the process used to deliver services. It ensures that taxpayers are 
receiving the best value and contractors are paying for what they performed. Another 
benefit of the PBSA is allowing greater competition to produce better solutions. PBSA 
allows contractors to offer their solution and performance measurements. Contractors 
prepare their solutions by taking into consideration governments’ requirements, price and 
competitive market forces. Contractors seek the best solution that meets the requirements 
at the lowest cost. Mather and Nelson (2006) stated that government can get good 
competition, reasonable price, better technical expertise and good QASP from serious 
and experienced offerors.   
PBSA offers some contract administration benefits by reducing government 
efforts by focusing on results rather than daily work process. PBSA requires fewer day-
to-day administrative activities and reporting requirements. These also lead to reduced 
administrative cost and overhead. Rosenberger (2003) stated that PBSA frees up the 
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government acquisition workforce engaged in administration of the contract and enables 
them to monitor the outcomes of the contract rather than the process.  
PBSA allows contractors the freedom to offer the most effective solution to 
government needs. This encourages contractors to be innovative and find cost effective 
ways of delivering services. In this concept, and in contrast to traditional service 
acquisition, the government does not force the contractors to use government dictated 
solution, thus allowing them more opportunity to operate without government 
interference.   According to Rosenberger (2003), PBSA liberates the contractor as the 
sole decision maker and expert to manage resources more effectively. Jennings and 
Jackson (2002) stated that the contract’s “how-to” is left to contractors to employ new 
and effective solutions. PBSA gives freedom to determine how best to meet the 
government’s requirements, allowing the government to take advantage of the industry’s 
experience and knowledge. The U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland 
Security (2008) pointed out:   
Performance-Based Contracting allows the government to issue contract 
without specifying what services it wants to buy. Instead, the government 
can issue a statement describing the problem it wants to solve and have the 
private sector propose a solution. This approach can provide the needed 
flexibility to promote innovation by business. (p. 1) 
Risks such as cost overruns, schedule delays, not meeting performance 
expectations and unacceptable quality are inevitable for every services acquisition. That 
is why government authorities try to find solutions to eliminate or reduce these risks. One 
of the tools the government acquisition workforce uses to reduce risk is PBSA. As stated 
in the GAO (2008) report, an appropriately planned and structured performance-based 
acquisition minimizes the risk of government receiving services that are over cost, 
delivered late and of poor quality. PBSA transfers this risk from government to 
contractor. In this acquisition concept, contractors do not have to use a government 
solution dictated in a SOW. They come with their own solution and bear the risk. 
Furthermore, and as with the risks of cost overruns, late delivery is better controlled. The 
United States Department of Defense (2000) also indicated that much of the risk is 
transferred to contractors, because contractors become responsible for delivering the end 
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results stated in the SOW by using their best practices and processes. This procurement 
concept does not eliminate the government responsibility for defining and determining 
the requirements. The defining requirement is the first step in the procurement process 
and government should give proper attention to this process. At the beginning of the 
procurement the government procurement professional should specify the required 
service, estimate the duration of service and emphasize desired results. All these efforts 
will help the government to obtain the best possible services and maximize the outcome. 
In summary, when properly structured, PBSA allows government to reduce cost 
and increase service quality. PBSA offers the federal government significant gain in cost 
savings, contractor responsibility, and better performance, while also reducing quality 
shortcomings and customer satisfaction. FCS Group (2005) identified more benefits in its 
literature search. The followings are the expectations and benefits of PBSA: 
• Encourages and promotes contractors to be innovative and find cost 
effective ways of delivering services 
• Gives the contractors more flexibility in general to achieve desired results 
• Shifts risk to contractors so they are responsible for achieving the 
objectives 
• Maximizes competitions and innovation 
• Results in better prices and performance 
• Expects contractors to control costs and achieves cost savings 
• Encourages contractors and government to work together to provide the 
best service to customer 
• Eliminates day-to-day monitoring 
• Allows government workforce to focus on outcomes of the contract 
D.  CHALLENGES OF PERFORMANCE-BASED SERVICE ACQUISITION 
Performance-Based Service Acquisition is an approach that focuses on results 
rather than dictating the manner in which the desired work is to be done. This approach 
has been used over the last twenty years across the United States government; service 
acquisition now represents more than 60% of contract spending for the federal 
government. Since PBSA was initiated, the federal government has been trying to 
increase the use of PBSA by setting targets. The government also provided training and 
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support to the acquisitions workforce on how to implement this new acquisition concept. 
OFPP has developed “Seven Steps To Performance-Based Service Acquisition,” which 
provides a road map, breaking the whole process down into logical steps. The Seven 
Steps Guide tries to make the concepts of PBSA accessible and logical for the acquisition 
workforce. In addition, other guidance and technical support have been provided to the 
government agencies to promote the use of this acquisition concept effectively. Almost 
every department of the federal government issued its policy guidance and manuals to 
show the implementation of PBSA. 
Although more than twenty years have passed and lots of training support has 
been provided, General Accounting Office reports and OFFP studies show us that there 
are implementation problems, challenges and unsatisfactory performance results from 
PBSA. These problems and challenges identified in reports and articles not only affect 
the government side but also deeply affect the contractors and industry. These challenges 
and implementation problems affects the government’s ability to get best value for the 
taxpayer dollars spent and improve the process and results.  Unsuccessful 
implementations also prevent government from benefiting from the creativity and 
innovation of private industry. The federal government’s rules and regulation for this 
acquisition are very clear. The methodology and guidance are provided to the acquisition 
workforce on how to implement PBSA. As GAO (2008) stated, despite its government-
wide acceptance, concerns have been raised over how well agencies are using the 
performance-based approach. For more than twenty years, agencies have been 
encouraged to use PBSA but the government has not reached the intended level of 
progress. There are many reasons for this slow progress and unsuccessful results. 
Lack of Skilled Acquisition Workforce: As we know, the success of the every 
system and organization is based on the human factor. If the workforce is skilled and 
educated in their profession, the organization can easily get the intended result in its 
activity. A skilled acquisition workforce is vital for success in federal acquisition. One of 
the reasons for poor PBSA results is lack of trained and experienced personnel in the 
agencies. In its report, the GAO (2007) stated that DoD is challenged in its ability to 
maintain workforce with the requisite knowledge of the technical details of the services 
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they procure and the ability to prepare clear statements of work and measurable 
performance standards. GAO (2008) shows us there is inadequate understanding among 
agencies on when and how to successfully carry out PBSA. There is an uncertainty on 
when and how to use this performance-based acquisition concept when obtaining services 
from the private sector in the federal acquisition environment. 
Poor Requirements Definition: Performance-Based Acquisition clearly spells out 
the desired results from the contract at the beginning of the acquisition process. It is very 
important to identify specific results that lead to targeted solutions. That is why the 
acquisition workforce has to know their desired outcomes and define performance 
requirements in terms of schedule, quality and quantity. According to the GAO (2008) 
report, requirements definition and performance standards influence outcomes for PBSA. 
Lack of well-defined requirements hinders the ability to hold contractors accountable for 
poor performance. Clearly defined requirements and measurable performance standards 
are critical to ensure control and accountability. But as GAO (2009) stated, agencies have 
difficulties defining requirement and outcome-based measures when acquiring services. 
Poor definition of requirement leads to poor performance, schedule delays, cost overruns 
and expectations. Poorly defined or unstable requirements lead to cost increases as well 
as poor customer satisfaction. Poor acquisition planning also increases the risk of the 
government receiving services that are over cost estimates, delivered late and of 
unacceptable quality. 
Lack of Acquisition Team: Lack of an acquisition team or a poorly designed 
acquisition team are other reasons that make PBSA unsuccessful. To get the best value 
from any acquisitions, an acquisition team is essential. PBSA is not an exception to this 
rule, but its success highly depends on close coordination of the different areas of 
expertise. An acquisition team enhances government’s ability to form a quite complete 
acquisition strategy that deals with all aspects of the requirements.  As Garrett (2007) 
stated, “Performance-Based Contracting is a collective responsibility that involves 
representatives from budget, technical, contracting, logistic, legal and program office.” In 
addition, recent policies and regulations have changed the acquisition process 
dramatically from process focused to results focused and mission focused. This new 
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acquisition environment forces agencies to form an acquisition team with a designated 
team leader to deal with its challenges. PBSA requires representatives with varied 
knowledge and skills to determine all aspect of the acquisition. It requires a team effort 
from different functional specialists to develop acquisition strategies, conduct market 
research, establish statements of objectives and measure the performance. Some services 
contracts GAO reviewed indicate that lack of collaboration between representatives from 
different areas of specialty is a challenge when developing and managing complex 
services acquisition (GAO, 2008, p. 1). 
Resistance to Change: In every organization, it is very difficult to deal with 
change. Everybody tends to do his/her job as before and resists any change. Most of the 
employees fear change that leads to a shift from the current situation to new and 
unfamiliar ones. This fact is more common in the government environment than in the 
private sector. This is because government is more bureaucratic, closed to innovations 
and needs more time to adapt itself to new conditions. This new acquisition approach also 
is more challenging for industry. They have to bear the risk and find innovative solutions 
to offer government. It is difficult to change people’s routine practices. That is why 
PBSA requires cultural transformations in both government and industry.   In her 
testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, Reed (2008) clearly explained 
this situation: 
PBA creates an opportunity for cultural transformation, to focus on results. 
Making the shift to focus on outcomes versus specified tasks or levels of 
effort requires a transformation in culture, perspective, and thinking. 
Without training and other support for implementing PBA techniques, 
many government acquisition professionals still follow a procurement 
process that first requires the development of a detailed statement of work 
or a specification that prescribes how the contractor should perform the 
work and then rely on monitoring compliance with that specification to 
manage execution. Many who take on this task believe a ‘‘tight spec is a 
good spec,’’ that the contractor must be told exactly what to do, how to do 
it, what labor categories to provide, what minimum qualifications to meet, 
and how many hours to work. But what if the contractor follows the 
government’s instructions to the letter and the result is still unacceptable? 
It is the government’s tightly specified ‘‘solution’’ that is at fault, not the 
contractor’s performance. The government and, ultimately, the public bear 
the risk and consequences of failure. (p. 26) 
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As a new acquisition method, PBSA is difficult for both parties. It calls for a new 
understanding of acquisition from both government and industry. Government and 
contractors should think clearly about the requirements to be accomplished and how to 
measure contractors’ performance. Both government and contractors should have clear 
sense of the contractors’ responsibilities. This is a different way of doing business for 
both government and industry. That is why clear communication, close coordination and 
mutual trust are critical to overcome the challenges of the new acquisition environment. 
Lack of Contract Administration: Another challenge of PBSA is management and 
assessment of contractor performance. There is a misunderstanding about post-award 
issues. Some acquisition personnel think that the contract award is an end but this 
perception is totally wrong, especially for the PBSA. Indeed, it is the beginning of the 
challenging step in which desired outcome is obtained and it demands specialized skills 
and resources. The most important process for performance-based acquisition is 
managing contractors’ performance. As stated in the GAO (2006) report, Service 
acquisition differs from product in several aspects and needs close and detailed control of 
contractor performance. The success of the acquisition is largely based on the 
management of contract. In this matter, Cavadias (2005) stated that “The success of a 
PBSA is highly dependent on the effort and resources invested in monitoring 
performance by using many sophisticated tools and metrics including performance 
indicators and standards, and quality assurance surveillance plans” (p. 327).  
In PBSA, the contractor`s performance should be managed and assessed 
adequately to ensure that proper action is taken under the contract. If proper oversight is 
not conducted, agencies are at risk of paying for poor performance. That is why oversight 
of PBSA requires more oversight and a skilled and experienced workforce than the other 
acquisition concepts. 
Increase in Complicated and Complex Services: Service acquisitions are growing 
larger and becoming more complicated in the federal government, and especially in the 
DoD, every day. As previously mentioned, over the last decade the use of federal service 
acquisitions has increased and now is 60 percent of federal procurements. With growing 
use of service acquisition, the variety of services also increases and this trend makes 
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PBSA more complicated and challenging. For example, DoD`s service acquisitions range 
from basic services to those that are more complex. Food service and landscaping are 
easy but we cannot say the same thing for intelligence analysis, security services and 
research and development services. Edwards and Ralph (2006) proposed that there are 
two different types of services. One of them is simple service acquisition, which is 
common, routine, short-term and repetitive. It is easy to define and acquire these kinds of 
services. They are well suited to PBSA.  On the other hand, the second category includes 
more complex and long-term services such as information technology service. A GAO 
(2008) report found that, “implementing a performance-based approach is often more 
difficult for complex acquisition because agencies begin with requirements that are less 
stable, making it difficult to establish measurable outcomes” (p. 7). 
According to the Edwards and Ralph (2006), PBSA is not a practical approach to 
buying long-term and complex services because it is unrealistic to ask agencies to define 
requirements that are not yet fully known and understood (p. 355). They clearly 
explained their reasoning:  
It is unrealistic to ask agencies to specify services at the time of contract 
award in clear, specific, objective, and measurable terms when future 
needs are not fully known or understood, requirements and priorities are 
expected to change during performance, and the circumstances and 
conditions of performance are not reliably foreseeable. Yet those are the 
difficulties faced by agencies and their contractors when they negotiate 
long-term and complex service contracts. 
In real life, parties to long-term and complex service contracts do not 
specify all requirements at the time of contract award in clear, specific, 
objective, and measurable terms. Instead, they engage in ad hoc decision 
making in response to emerging and changing requirements, shifting 
priorities, and unexpected circumstances. They make it up as they go 
along, developing and adjusting expectations and agreements accordingly. 
Reality is never the same as expectations and projections, and plans and 
agreements go awry. No matter how long and hard future needs are 
considered, contracts will include things that will not be needed and leave 
out things that will be. Specifications and expectations must be adjusted 
over the course of time. Thus, in requiring that agencies fully specify 




something that is too hard to do and sets them up to fail. More training 
will not make PBSA appropriate for long-term and complex service 
acquisitions. (p. 355) 
As Mather and Nelson (2006) stated, performance-based service acquisition 
focuses on the outcome and end product. But it is very critical to evaluate every phase of 
software development services. As the literature shows, PBSA is well suited to those 
simple and routine service acquisitions that are well defined, but it is difficult and 
challenging when procuring complex and long-term services that cannot be defined 
clearly at the outset of acquisition.  
FCS Group’s (2005) study, “Best Practices and Trends in Performance Based 
Contracting,” is one of the articles that raised concerns related to PBSA and identified a 
variety of issues and problems when agencies use this acquisition concept. The following 
are the important problems and challenges: 
• Poor requirements and definition of performance measures  
• Lack of skilled and trained acquisition workforce 
• Lack of coordination between agencies’ departments and experts 
• Inadequate oversight of contract  
• Misunderstanding that PBSA takes more time than traditional methods  
• Difficulties of giving up old habits 
• The fear of change and resistance against new acquisition approach 
• The perception that performance measures are difficult to understand and 
complicated to implement  
• Trying to implement all kinds of service acquisitions 
• The shift of emphasis from process to outputs 
• Lack of knowledge about performance-based acquisition  
• Lack of communication between contractors and government 
E. SUMMARY 
The aim of service acquisition is to obtain the right service, at the right price, in 
the right way and from the right supplier. The solution provided by the service 
procurement should satisfy the customer needs. To achieve this at the beginning of every 
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acquisition process, the agencies’ requirements should be well defined and stated by the 
agency itself. After that point, the success of a performance-based service contract rests 
heavily on post-award monitoring and management. The contract management process is 
very critical to obtain best value from the service procurement. This challenging stage 
requires a skilled and trained contracting workforce to closely monitor the contractor 
performance. The acquisition workforce should operate as a team with a designated team 
leader to overcome the challenges of this new concept. It is essential that all stakeholders 
be involved throughout the service acquisition life cycle, from the requirements 
determination phase through contract closeout. The team should be multi-functional to 
plan and manage service contracts throughout the life of the requirement. The expertise 
and contributions of each team member are important to the success of a service 
acquisition.  
PBSC is the preferred contracting method and mandated by regulations when 
procuring services in the U.S., but is not a perfect solution for every service type. 
Naturally, as a system or process it has some advantages and some difficulties. Although 
PBSC helps the government side to save money and increase quality, it is difficult to use 
this procurement concept for the complex services that are not well defined at the early 
stage of procurement. Unlike the traditional procurement methods, PBSC requires 
cultural changes and more training. This training and cultural transformation needs time 
and will be gradual. It is clear that moving to performance-based service contracting may 
take time, since a major shift in government procurement process and contracts 
administration is not going to happen immediately. 
To this point, the implementation of PBSC has been analyzed, its benefits and its 
shortfalls.  It can be said that this procurement concept has more benefits than its 
challenges. It has been used successfully in the U.S. has been mandated by the federal 
government. But to determine its applicability to Turkey it needs to examine current 
Turkish rules and regulations. The following chapter focuses on the current public 
procurement process in Turkey, after which it becomes easy to determine if there is any 
barrier to implementing PBSC in Turkey. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT ACQUISITION 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The world we live in is becoming smaller with the help of information 
technology. Anyone in the world can easily access the information available in 
cyberspace. In this information era, sometimes even a secret document can be leaked and 
released to the public. All of the actions taken by the government are under strict control 
of the public and media. Newspaper and television focus on government activities. All 
these things are true for the defense departments of the most countries. These 
departments seek ways to operate fully within the limited budget and resources. Day by 
day, public pressure on defense budgets is increasing and leads to significant defense 
budget cuts. Defense policy makers are trying to do more with less funding. Budget cuts 
in defense spending force defense authorities to give importance to efficiency and 
innovation. For that reason, PBSC was developed in the United States. The emphasis is 
on performance of the government agencies when spending public resources. The goal is 
the best value returned for every dollar spent. 
As every change in the world affects Turkey directly, changes in public 
procurement policy in the world and the U.S. also affect it indirectly. The Turkey 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) also faces significant budget cuts and its actions and 
spending are under public focus. For that reason, the MOD should find better operating 
solutions. It has to focus on performance of the departments and spend its limited budget 
wisely. In the future, MOD may face more budget cuts and public pressure about its 
performance. It is time for MOD to find innovation in its spending to overcome the 
effects of adverse budget cuts.  This research has examined PBSC as just such an 
innovation.  
This chapter focuses on the current Turkish MOD service acquisition environment 
and determines which service is used by MOD and any barriers or policies that prevent 
use of PBSC. It also discusses the current service acquisition process and regulation 
governing the service procurement in detail. 
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B. MOD CURRENT SERVICE ACQUISITIONS ACTIVITIES 
1. Background 
Procuring service from the private sector has received great emphasis in the world 
defense environment, especially in DoD. Today, approximately 60% of the DoD budget 
is spent for services acquisition. But this percentage is much smaller in Turkey. For 
example, for fiscal year 2009, 49.2% of the total MOD budget was planned for procuring 
good and services. The main reason of limited service acquisition in MOD is perception 
that some of the services are part of the military function. For example, for many years 
food service was seen as a function that must be carried out by military. To provide food 
services to the troops, every military installation or base must have a kitchen and 
adequate personnel to cook and serve. As you can guess it is not possible to find enough 
resources to provide this kind of services professionally. Another reason was lack of 
sufficient commercial market to provide services needed by MOD, but recently with the 
growing Turkish economy it easy to procure every kind of services professionally.  
As compared with DoD service acquisition, Turkey MOD service acquisition is 
small and limited, but day by day MOD is seeking commercial market solutions in order 
to free up more soldiers for potential combat duties. The war-fighting capability is very 
important for Turkey because Turkey is located at the center of the Balkans, Caucasus 
and the Middle East, where the threats and risks are concentrated. This situation, 
stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location, has not changed and will not change in the 
future. That is why Turkey should maintain a military force that will provide a deterrent 
influence on instability and uncertainty surrounding itself. Turkey’s Armed Forces are 
currently the second largest military in NATO and the second most technologically 
advanced military in the Middle East. The massive conscript armies have lost their 
importance in the western world since maintaining such personnel-heavy military forces 
is costly and not effective to protect the country. Because of that, Turkish Defense 
Authorities are looking for ways to develop a smaller, deployable and more professional 
military force in the same way its European and North American allies have already 
done. Pursuit of a professional armed force encourages MOD to give up some services 
carried out by soldiers and procure them from the private sector. Acquisition of some 
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services from the private sector allows MOD to focus on its main activities and functions 
such as military training and exercises. Another reason for MOD to procure services from 
the private sector is to benefit commercial market business practices. Today, the budget 
of MOD is limited and under strict controls of government and public. As shown in Table 
1 and Figure 2, MOD budgets have been cut every year since 1998.  
 
Table 2.   Turkey Defense Budget 1998–2008 
YEARS GDP NATIONAL MOD MOD MOD BUDGET
1998 53,518,332.00 14,789,475.00 1,390,263.00 2.6% 9.4% 
1999 78,282,967.00 27,266,600.00 2,507,010.00 3.2% 9.2% 
2000 125,596,129.00 46,827,436.00 4,136,500.00 3.3% 8.8% 
2001 176,483,953.00 79,159,490.00 5,376,585.00 3.0% 6.8% 
2002 275,032,366.00 98,131,000.00 8,234,969.00 3.0% 8.4% 
2003 356,680,888.00 147,230,170.00 10,209,250.00 2.9% 6.9% 
2004 428,932,343.00 149,945,082.00 10,011,847.00 2.3% 6.7% 
2005 485,058,000.00 156,088,874.00 10,977,067.00 2.3% 7.0% 
2006 575,784,000.00 174,958,101.00 11,877,533.00 2.1% 6.8% 
2007 646,893,000.00 204,902,263.00 13,052,393.00 2.0% 6.4% 
2008 716,596,000.00 222,553,217.00 13,272,707.00 1.9% 6.0% 
 
 
Figure 2.   Turkey Defense Budget In GDP Trends 1998–2008 
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That is why MOD is trying to find ways to get the best solution for its service 
requirements. MOD’s main goal is to acquire goods and services in accordance with law, 
cost, schedule, and quality. MOD is procuring some services simply to reduce costs, 
increase quality and efficiency when reducing the workforce. 
Most government departments procure service, which creates opportunities for 
government work for the private sector. But the Ministry of Defense does not use a wide 
range of services. Outsourcing is used only when procuring food, transportation and 
cleaning facilities services.  
2. Food Services  
In Turkey, as stated in Article 72 of the constitution, "National service is the right 
and duty of every male Turkish citizen. The manner in which this service shall be 
performed, or considered as performed, either in the armed forces or in the public service, 
shall be regulated by law." Based on the constitution, all male citizens who pass a 
physical examination are obligated to perform active-duty service for fifteen months. 
During military services, all soldiers except officers and NCOs must be fed by the 
government. All their basic needs are provided by the Turkish Government. This rule 
also covers all military staff including officers and NCOs in a war or exercises. That is 
why every military base, installation and training center has kitchen facilities and 
required staff to feed soldiers and military students. This was not a cost effective way to 
get services so some military centers such as Army War College, Military School and 
Military Hospitals stopped providing food service to their staff and began to outsource 
from commercial catering firms. Although they faced some challenges, this practice 
continues in the MOD environment. But it is difficult to determine whether the 
government gets best performance or not. Other military elements such as brigades and 
divisions provide food services by keeping kitchens open since they are scattered all over 
the country and could find responsive contractors. 
3. Personnel Transportation Services 
The MOD provides shuttle service to all officers, NCOs and civilian workers 
when they are coming and leaving base. Previously, this service was provided by military 
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vehicles and buses but recently all of MOD elements outsource this service from 
commercial firms. In the recent past, every military base had to maintain shuttles or buses 
to carry its personnel. These vehicles required significant operating and maintenance 
cost, and in addition were not as comfortable as service provided by civilian firms. In the 
MOD environment almost every base requires transportation services from commercial 
firms especially in big crowded cities like Istanbul and Ankara. Only a few bases provide 
these services using their vehicles just because of security concerns.  
4. Cleaning Services 
Normally, military base cleaning services are provided by soldiers (privates). 
Military schools and training centers have civilian workers to clean their installations. In 
MOD environment commercial firms are only used to clean military hospitals because 
keeping hospitals clean and hygienic is important in terms of healthcare. These service 
requirements cannot be met by military resources and should be outsourced from 
professional commercial firms. 
C. CURRENT TURKISH SERVICES ACQUISITION RULES AND 
REGULATIONS  
1. Overview 
There are two important and main laws that govern the public acquisition process 
in Turkey. These are Turkish Public Procurement Law (No: 4734) and Public 
Procurement Contracts Law (No: 4735), both of which were enacted in 2002 by the 
Turkish Parliament. These two laws were enacted to adjust Turkish acquisition 
procedures to the European Union regulations. The purpose of Turkish Public 
Procurement Law is to establish the principles and procedures to be applied in 
procurements held by all public entities and institutions governed by public law or under 
public control or using public funds. The purpose of Public Procurement Contract is to 
establish the principles and procedures that pertain to making and implementing public 
procurement contracts under Public Procurement Law. Also, the Turkish Ministry of 
Finance issued Regulation on Implementation of Services Procurements to explained how 
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to procure services from private sectors in accordance with Turkish Public Procurement 
Law (No: 4734) and Public Procurement Contracts Law (No: 4735). 
Turkish Public Procurement Law (No: 4734) clearly explains and defines Service 
in Article 4 as follows: 
Services: (Amendment: 4964/Article 3) relating to maintenance and 
repair, transportation, communication, insurance, research and 
development, accounting, market surveys and polls, consultancy, 
architecture and engineering, surveying and project, map and cadastre, 
development application, development plan in any scale, promoting, 
broadcasting and publication, cleaning, catering, meeting, organization, 
exhibition, guarding and security, professional training, photography, film, 
intellectual and fine arts, computer systems and software services, lease of 
movable and immovable properties and the rights thereof, and other 
similar services. 
We understood from this definition that Turkish Public Procurement Law (No: 
4734) allows government departments to procure a wide range of services. But as stated 
before, in the MOD environment just a few of them are commonly used. There are some 
basic rules the government departments have to obey. These basic rules, found in Article 
5 of the Turkish Public Procurement Law (No: 4734) are: 
• In tenders to be conducted in accordance with this Law, the contracting 
entities are liable for ensuring transparency, competition, equal treatment; 
reliability, confidentiality, public supervision, and procurement of needs 
are being carried out under appropriate conditions and in a timely manner, 
and for the efficient use of resources.  
• Unless there is a natural and justifiable connection between them, 
purchase of goods, services and works cannot be consolidated in the same 
procurement. 
• Goods, services or works to be procured cannot be divided into lots with 
the intention of avoiding threshold values.  
• For the procurements to be held in accordance with this Law, the principal 
procurement methods are open and restricted procedures. The other 
methods may be used under the special conditions set out in the Law. 
• The procurement proceedings shall not be initiated unless there is a 




• In accordance with the related legislation, for the works requiring an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report, a positive EIA report 
must be obtained before the initiation of procurement proceedings. 
However, in works procurements to be made urgently due to natural 
disasters, EIA report shall not be required. 
2. Current Implementation of Service Acquisition 
The service acquisition process begins when the department determines their 
requirements. After determining requirements all the contracting works are carried out by 
the logistician, Tender Commission and Finance branch. In this process, most jobs are 
done by logisticians who define technical and administrative specifications of the 
required services.  The logistician prepares an acquisition file that includes approval of 
acquisition, Administrative Specifications Document, Technical Specification Document, 
Cost Estimation, Market Research and Determination of the Contracting Method. After 
completion of the acquisition file, the logistician sends it to the Tender Commission. All 
activities carried out in the service acquisition process are as following: 
a. Determination of Requirement`s Specifications 
As soon as a requirement is requested by the military units or elements, 
the logistician checks the sufficient budget allocation by coordinating with the finance 
branch. If there is sufficient funding, the finance branch approves the acquisition process 
and the logistics branch begins to prepare the acquisition file, which includes all related 
documents. One of the documents is the Administrative Specifications Document, which 
defines procurement objectives, bid participations requirements, evaluation criteria and 
awarding processes. The other document is the Technical Specification Document, which 
indicates the technical details and requirements of the services to be procured. This 
document cannot contain the matters hindering competition, and should provide equal 
opportunity for all tenderers. The Logistics branch benefits from industry and MOD 
Technical Specifications prepared in advance when preparing this document. In the 
Technical Specification Document, services requested are defined in detail by logistics 
branch personnel. This document shows contractors how to perform the work requested. 
Turkish rules and regulation does not allow industry to propose solutions.  
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b. Cost Estimation 
The Logistics Branch is responsible for making cost estimation and 
preparing the Cost Estimation Calculation Statement. The branch has to prepare this 
statement and supporting documents and annexes to the acquisition file before getting 
approval of the unit commander. In determination of estimated cost, the logistics branch 
can benefit from the public authorities and institutions according to the nature of services 
and can use prices and rates in identical or similar services realized by the contracting 
entity or other administrations. The estimated cost ascertained by the contracting entities 
before the procurement shall not be announced and released to the tenderers or other 
persons who do not have an official relation with the procurement process. 
c. Determination of Applicable Procurement Procedure  
Determination of Applicable Procurement Procedure is made by the 
Logistics Branch. According to the Turkish Public Procurement Law (No: 4734) Article 
8, there are three kinds of procedures the Logistic Branch can use. These are 
1) Open procedure.  In the open procedure, all the vendors and 
service providers who are willing to participate in the bidding can submit their proposal. 
There are no restrictions to prevent vendors’ participation in the bidding. To propose an 
offer, all tenderers should have required certificates and documents stated in 
Administrative Specifications Document. 
2) Restricted procedure.   Restricted procedure is a procedure 
in which tenderers, who are invited following pre-qualification by the contracting entity, 
can submit their offer. Procurement of services may be conducted by restricted procedure 
where open procedure is not applicable due to the complexity of the requirement that 
needs expertise and advanced technology. 
3) Negotiated procedure.  The services procurements may be 
held through the negotiated procedure in the following cases: 
• If there is not any tender submitted as a result of procurement held through 
the open or restricted procedure 
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• If it is compulsory to hold the procurement urgently when instantaneous 
and unexpected cases or the events that cannot be anticipated by the 
contracting entity such as the natural disasters, epidemic diseases, risk of 
deaths or loss of properties arise 
• If it is compulsory to hold the procurement urgently when the special 
cases arise concerning the defense and security 
• If the procurement requires research and development process and is not 
subject to the serial production 
• If the technical and financial properties of the services, which constitute 
the subject matter of the procurement, cannot be defined as clearly as 
required since the said services are exclusive and complicated 
• The services procurements of the contracting entities with an estimated 
cost up to the amount set forth in paragraph (f) of Article 21 of Law No: 
4734. 
In negotiated procurement procedure, negotiations are carried out 
with the tenderers who meet qualifications stated in the Administrative Specifications 
Document. The tender commission, similar to the Source Selection Board in the U.S., 
negotiates with each tenderer and evaluates their technical capabilities and expertise. 
After evaluation, the tenderers who have sufficient technical capacity and capability are 
asked to submit final proposals, and the contract is awarded to the Offeror who proposes 
the lowest price. If the number of tenderers submitting tenders is less than three, then the 
procurement process is cancelled. 
d. Advertisement of Procurement (Solicitation) 
The Logistics Branch sends the Acquisition File to the Tender 
Commission as soon as they finish preparation. After that point, the procurement process 
will be carried out by the Tender Commission that consists of at least five members and 
in odd numbers, including one chairperson, at least four personnel of the related 
contracting entity (Command, Military Base), provided that two of them are experts on 
the subject matter of the requirements, a financial officer in cases of general budget and 
annexed budget entities, and in case of other entities a person responsible for accounting 
and finance, together with its substitute members. All public procurement shall be 
advertised locally or nationwide according to the Threshold Values that are determined at 
the beginning of every fiscal year. The Tender Commission is responsible for advertising 
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all procurement. The advertisement shall include the following information: name, 
telephone number and address of the Tender Commission; types and quantities of the 
required services; start and closeout dates of the contract; bidding date and place; 
contracting method; the documents and certificates needed for the qualification 
evaluation; qualification evaluation criteria; and the place to see or buy the tender 
document.  
The Tender Commission has to give all tenderers sufficient time to 
prepare their offer. The time given is based on procurement procedure and Threshold 
Values. Procurement with estimated costs equal to or exceeding the threshold values 
stated in Article 8 shall be advertised by publishing in the Official Gazette, at least once; 
if open procedure is conducted the procurement shall be published not less than forty 
days prior to deadline for the submission of tenders. If restricted procedure is conducted, 
pre-qualification notices of procurements shall be published not less than fourteen days in 
advance of the deadline for the application to pre-qualification and if negotiated 
procedure is conducted notices inviting candidates shall be published not less than 
twenty-five days prior to the deadline for the submission of tenders. 
For procurements with estimated costs below the threshold values given in 
Article 8, the notices of procurements to be conducted for the procurement of goods or 
services shall be published at least once in not less than two newspapers being issued 
where the procurement is to be held and the work is to be performed, a minimum of 
seven days in advance of the deadline for the submission of tenders or shall be published 
at least once in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers being issued where the 
work is to be performed minimum fourteen days in advance of the deadline for the 
submission of tenders or shall be published at least once in the Official Gazette and in 
one of the newspapers being issued where the work is to be performed minimum twenty-
one days in advance of the deadline for the submission of tenders. This time frame 
determination is based on threshold values. 
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e. Evaluation of Offer and Contract Award 
The Offeror shall submit their proposal in writing and signed. The 
proposal shall be submitted to the contracting entity no later than the date and hour 
specified in the advertisement. The number of offers submitted shall be recorded in the 
minutes by the Tender Commission and announced to those who are present, and then the 
Tender Commission shall examine the tender envelopes in the order of submission. 
Envelopes that are not in compliance with paragraph 1 of Article 30 shall be recorded in 
the minutes and shall not be included in the evaluation stage. The envelopes shall be 
opened in the presence of tenderers and those who are present, in the order of submission. 
It shall be checked if the documents of the offerors are complete or incomplete. Offers 
with incomplete documents or improperly prepared shall be recorded in the minutes. The 
offerors and their prices shall be announced. The minutes relating to these proceedings 
shall be signed by the Tender Commission. At this stage, no decision shall be made with 
regard to rejection or acceptance of any of the offerors, and the documents consisting of 
the offer cannot be corrected or completed. The session shall be closed for immediate 
evaluation of the offer by the Tender Commission. 
The Tender Commission shall exclude the offers that are incomplete or are 
not in compliance with the requirements stated in the advertisement and Administrative 
Specification Document. After that point, offers that are complete and appropriate shall 
be held subject to a detailed evaluation. At this stage, the offerors shall be examined for 
their conformity with the qualification criteria determining the capacity of the offeror to 
perform the contract. Any offerors that are found ineligible shall be disqualified. 
At the final stage, the price charts annexed to the offer shall be checked 
for any arithmetic errors. In case of errors in the multiplication or addition in the annexed 
chart of the tender letter demonstrating the offered prices, these arithmetic errors shall be 
corrected by the tender commission ex officio, on the basis of the unit prices offered by 
the offerors. The corrected price shall be accepted as the actual offer.  The Tender 
Commission evaluates all offers in term of price, operation and maintenance costs, cost-
effectiveness, productivity, quality and technical merit. Tender Commissions shall decide 
the best offer that is economically most advantageous to the government. The 
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commission decisions are made according to a majority of the votes received. Members 
who disagree with the commission’s decision must write down the justification for their 
dissenting position in the records of commission minutes. The decision of the Tender 
Commission is not the final decision and needs to be approved by the commander of the 
base or military element. The commander is free to reject all offers and cancel the 
procurement. After approval of the tender commission’s decision, the contract shall be 
awarded to the economically most advantageous offer.  
f. Inspection, Acceptance and Payment 
Inspection and acceptance of services are performed by the “Inspection 
Commissions,” formed within the military base. Inspection commissions consist of at 
least three members, with the senior member the chairperson of the commission. One of 
the members has to be an expert in service or goods. Inspection commissions are 
responsible for ensuring that all goods delivered and services performed comply with the 
contract. The commission decides according to the majority of the votes. Payments are 
made to the contractor periodically (usually monthly) for services performed. However, 
the Commanding Officer should approve the payment order before funds are transferred.  
The Financial Office is responsible for ensuring that all documents conform to the rules 
and regulations, and making payment to the contractors. 
D. SUMMARY 
The Performance-Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) concept developed and 
applied successfully in the DoD and federal environment in United States might be 
beneficial for the Turkish MOD. But Turkish acquisition rules and regulations can be 
barriers to implement PBSA within Turkey. There are two important and main laws that 
govern public acquisition process. These are Turkish Public Procurement Law (No: 4734) 
and Public Procurement Contracts Law (No: 4735), both of which were enacted in 2002 
by the Turkish Parliament. These two laws were enacted to adjust Turkish acquisition 
procedures to the European Union regulations. The Turkish Public Acquisition Law 
allows government departments to outsource service from commercial firms. In the near  
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future, it is supposed that government will not enact any other law to regulate 
government acquisition process. This law allows government agencies to acquire a wide 
range of services including ill-defined and complex ones.  
The strongest facet of PBSA is to give government an opportunity to use 
monetary incentives to motivate contractors and control cost and risk of the work to be 
performed. But in Turkey the only contract type used in the public acquisition process is 
firm-fixed price, and Procurement Contracts Law (No: 4735) does not allow government 
contracting entities to use incentives. This situation is not a barrier for implementing 
PBSA in Turkey, but in this case we cannot motivate contractors and get best value as 
much as the American government can do.  
Another issue is that Turkish regulations force the government to dictate a 
solution by writing technical specifications and a SOW. Turkish Public Procurement Law 
mandates the use of the technical specification document in the acquisition process. In the 
Turkish service acquisition process, technical specifications and SOWs are always 
prepared by the government side. The writing of the technical specification documents 
and SOW requires a great deal of effort and expertise. Personnel responsible for writing 
technical specification documents and SOW spend significant time and effort on these 
activities. But they are not very successful in writing technical specification documents 
and SOW, simply because they are not expert in every service area. And sometimes their 
dictated solutions in these documents are not the best solution for the service required. 
This legal situation prevents industry from proposing their solutions to government. This 
is the most important drawback for the applicability of PBSA in Turkey. 
There are not any permanent contracting branches or entities to carry out the 
acquisition process in Turkey. Usually some of the supply officers are assigned to the 
contracting office to conduct acquisition for three or four years. At the end of this time 
they might be assigned another position in the MOD. This is also a strong barrier to 
implementing PBSA in MOD, since this contracting concept requires a skilled and 
experienced acquisition workforce. It is very difficult to implement PBSA in MOD with 
the current acquisition personnel because this acquisition method requires careful 
consideration to prepare performance standards and metrics. Also, the inspection and 
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acceptance commissions are not permanent and their staffs are not expert in acquisition 
and logistics. To measure contractor performance, this commission should consist of 
skilled and expert personnel in logistics area  
The industry is also an important element for the successful implementation of 
PBSA. As we know, PBSA have been used more than twenty years in the United States 
but there are some implementation problems. Industry is challenged to understand and 
submit proposals for this acquisition method. The service industry in Turkey is not 
developed and it is difficult for the industry to understand and propose solutions to 
government. In summary, to implement PBSA in MOD defense activities, new 
regulations should be enacted to allow government to incentivize contractors and accept 
industry solutions. Also, the current contracting workforce should be educated and 
assigned permanently to the contracting positions.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. SUMMARY 
We live in a commercial world in which most of the government agencies and 
commercial firms trade with each other. Today, this commercial world is very 
competitive and no agency or firm can do everything on their own. They usually use 
outsourcing to perform some of their mission. The government agencies also use service 
contracting to provide better service to the public. Their primary tool used for 
outsourcing is service contracts. These contracts provide a wide range of services that 
touch almost all of the departments’ activities, including health care, support to 
intelligence activities, contracting support, and various professional, management and 
administrative services, such as budget and program management. In addition to these 
well-known and daily services, some service contracts provide a wide range of support to 
government defense missions. For example, U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq are 
supported by service contractors who provide base support, weapons and equipment 
maintenance, communication support, interrogators, security, engineering support, and 
administrative support (United States Government Accountability Office, 2009). 
But, it is difficult to ensure that government gets best value for the taxpayers’ 
money and obtains quality services in a cost-efficient and effective manner in every 
service contract. Every contract has risk that the government may receive products or 
services that are over budget, delivered late and of unacceptable quality. To deal with 
these kinds of problems, Performance-Based Service Contracting may be a solution for 
government agencies. Government agencies can use PBSC as a method of procuring 
services from the private sector. In traditional service contracts, agencies usually spend 
their time in preparing detailed specifications or performance work statements for the 
contractors. The aim of these documents is to tell how to perform agencies’ needs or 
solve agencies’ problems. In these documents, the government agencies dictate their 




instead of letting the contractors do what government agencies pay contractors to do. 
And, also, by binding the contractors to work statements, agencies impose their solution 
on the contractors. 
PBSA is not a new acquisition technique. It has been used in United States for 
more than twenty years. In the current DoD procurement environment, Performance-
Based Service Contracting has been a hot topic since April 1991, when the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued Letter 91-2 on service contracting. Since that 
time, performance-based acquisition has become a business necessity in both the public 
and private business sectors. The U.S. federal government had mandated that agencies 
and departments comply with performance-based guidelines and requirements. The main 
goal of this concept is to get best value in response to taxpayer dollars spent. A major 
focus of the Bush Administration was to create a better government that is result-
oriented. That is why procurement authorities focused on the result of the contracting 
rather than process. This approach leads PBSA to hold center stage in service acquisition 
and makes it a major trend within the federal procurement environment. 
Performance-Based Service Acquisition is not, itself, a contract type. There is a 
common misperception that Performance-Based Service Contracting refers to a specific 
type of contract. PBSA is defined in FAR Part 37.6, which does not prefer any type of 
contract. Performance-Based Service Acquisition describes the desired outcome of the 
process rather than giving a detailed, “how to” process the contractor must follow. 
Describing the requirement in terms of desired outcomes give freedom to the contractor 
to choose the most efficient way to achieve a desired outcome. Performance-Based 
Service Acquisition is concerned with defining the tasks to be performed by the 
contractor, establishing observable and measurable performance standards in the 
requirements of the contract, and developing a method to assess the contractor’s 
performance in accordance with inspection and acceptance requirements of the contract. 
Performance-Based Service Acquisition requires that agencies tell industry “what” they 
want accomplished as opposed to “how” to accomplish the requirement.  This approach 
shifts a majority of the risk for successful performance from the government to the 
contractor.  It allows industry to use innovative practices and control their ability to make 
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profits based on their performance.  Performance-Based Service Acquisition is the best 
way to motivate a contractor to take responsibility for achieving acceptable performance.  
PBSA has unique characteristics that distinguish it from traditional contract 
methods. The primary characteristic of performance-based service acquisition is to 
describe the requirement in terms of the desired result to the maximum extent possible, 
and minimize orders that tell the contractor how to do the work or how to achieve the 
result. The other elements of Performance-Based Service Acquisition are stated below:  
• Performance Work Statement 
• Measurable performance standards (in terms of quality, timeliness, and 
quantity) 
• A method of assessing contractor adherence to the standards  
• Positive and negative performance incentives where appropriate 
The Performance Work Statement is the most important element of a PBSA and 
the indicator for success. Without a SOW it is difficult to get best value and desired 
outcomes because PWS reflects the current state and the desired end-state. At this point, 
the government should not dictate the specification or the solution, which would 
minimize the opportunity for bidders to offer innovative solutions to the identified 
problem. That is one of the principle reasons for using the performance-based acquisition 
concept. 
The measurable performance standards are another important factor for the 
success of the PBSA. The performance standards might be in terms of quality, timeliness 
and quantity. The standards must be measurable and structured to allow a fair and 
objective evaluation of the contractor’s performance. These performance measures 
should be tied to the outcomes to be achieved and should be limited in number. 
One important element of the PBSA is assessing contractor performance against 
the performance standards. The most common method for assessing contractor 
performance is the requirement for the government to have a quality assurance 
surveillance plan (QASP). The government may either prepare the QASP or require the 
contractor to submit a proposed plan for the government’s use with its proposal. The last 
characteristic of PBSA is the use of performance incentives, where appropriate. Positive 
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incentives are critical for the desired outcomes. Incentives can be monetary or non-
monetary positive or negative, but they should be positive to encourage contractors, and 
focused on the outcomes to be achieved.  
In service acquisition, the main objective is to get the right service, at the right 
time and in the right manner. The services obtained should meet cost, schedule, and 
performance requirements. If PBSA is successfully implemented it can help improve 
service acquisition outcomes and ensure that the services obtained meet cost, schedule, 
and performance requirements. This is because PBSA describes outcome-oriented 
requirements, measurable performance standards, and quality assurance surveillance 
plan. Some of the other important objectives of PBSA were articulated by the United 
States Department of Defense (2000). DoD emphasized that, by describing requirements 
in terms of outcomes, agencies can help achieve the following objectives: 
• Maximize Performance 
• Maximize Competition and Innovation 
• Encourage and Promote the Use of Commercial Services 
• Shift in Risk 
• Achieve Savings 
B. CONCLUSION 
Procuring service from the private sector has become a point of emphasis in the 
world defense environment, especially in DoD. Today, approximately 60% of the DoD 
budget is spent for services acquisition. However, the percentage is small in Turkey. For 
example, for fiscal year 2009 49.2% of the total MOD budget was planned for procuring 
good and services. The main reason of limited service acquisition in MOD is perception 
that some services are part of the military function. For example, for many years food 
service was accepted as a function that must be carried out by the military. Another 
reason was lack of sufficient commercial market to provide services needed by MOD.  
However, with the growing Turkish economy, today it is easy to procure every kind of 
service professionally.  
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As compared with DoD service acquisition, Turkey’s MOD service acquisition is 
small and limited, but day-by-day MOD is seeking commercial market solutions to carry 
out some service activities in order to free up troops for potential combat operations. The 
war-fighting capability is very important for Turkey because Turkey is located at the 
center of the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, where the threats and risks are 
concentrated. This situation, stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location, has not 
changed until the present and will not change in the future. That is why Turkey should 
maintain a military force that will provide a deterrent influence on instability and 
uncertainty surrounding itself. Because of that, Turkish Defense Authorities are looking 
for ways to develop a smaller, deployable and more professional military force in the 
same way its European and North American allies have already done. Pursuit of a 
professional armed force encourages MOD to give up some services carried out by 
soldiers and procure them from the private sector. Another reason for MOD to procure 
services from the private sector is to benefit commercial market business practices. 
Today, the budget of MOD is limited and under strict controls of government and public. 
That is the reason why MOD is trying to find ways to get the best solution for its service 
requirements. MOD‘s main goal is to acquire goods and services in accordance with law, 
cost, schedule, and quality. MOD is procuring some services simply to reduce costs, 
increase quality and efficiency when reducing workforce. Although an acquisition service 
from the private sector creates opportunities for government and Turkish Public 
Acquisition Law gives permission, MOD does not use a wide range of services. 
Outsourcing is used only when procuring food, transportation and cleaning facilities 
services.  
The aim of the service acquisition is to obtain the right service, at the right price, 
in the right way and from the right supplier. The Performance-Based Service Acquisition 
is not a perfect solution but is a preferred acquisition method when getting service in the 
Federal Acquisition environment. It has been used more than twenty years and mandated 
for federal service acquisition. Naturally, as with every system or process, it has benefits 
and challenges. In some cases it is a convenient tool to get best value for the taxpayer 
money. But in some cases it is too difficult to implement this acquisition concept.  
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The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (1998) study on performance-based 
contracts for service acquisition showed that benefits including reduced acquisition cost, 
increased competition for contracts and improved contractors performance had been 
achieved. When properly structured, PBSA allows government to reduce cost and 
increase service quality. PBSA offers the federal government significant gain in cost 
savings, contractor responsibility, and better performance; reduces quality shortcomings 
and increases customer satisfaction. The followings are the expectations and benefits 
identified in previous chapters. PBSA: 
• Encourages and promotes contractors to be innovative and find cost 
effective ways of delivering services 
• Gives the contractors more flexibility in general to achieve desired results 
• Shifts risk to contractors so they are responsible for achieving the 
objectives 
• Maximizes competitions and innovation 
• Results in better prices and performance 
• Expects contractors to control costs and achieve cost savings 
• Encourages contractors and government to work together to provide the 
best service to customer 
• Eliminates day-to-day monitoring 
• Allows government workforce to focus on outcomes of the contract 
Although more than twenty years has passed and lots of training support has been 
provided, General Accounting Office reports and OFFP studies show us that there are 
implementation problems, challenges and unsatisfactory performance results from PBSA. 
These problems and challenges identified in reports and articles do not only affect the 
government side but also they deeply affect the contractors and industry. These 
challenges and implementation problems affect the government’s ability to get best value 
for the taxpayer dollars spent.  Unsuccessful implementations also prevent government 
from benefiting from the creativity and innovation of private industry. As GAO (2008) 
stated despite its government-wide acceptance, concerns have been raised how well 
agencies are using performance-based approach. For more than twenty years, agencies 
have been encouraged to use PBSA but the government has not reached the intended 
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level of progress. There are many reasons for this slow progress and unsuccessful results. 
FCS Group’s (2005) study, “Best Practices and Trends in Performance Based 
Contracting” is one of the articles that raised concerns related to PBSA and identified a 
variety of issues and problems occurring when agencies use this acquisition concept. The 
following are the important problems and challenges: 
• Poor requirements and performance measures defining 
• Lack of skilled and trained acquisition workforce 
• Lack of coordination between agencies’ departments and experts 
• Inadequate oversight of contract  
• Misunderstanding that PBSA takes more time than traditional ones  
• Difficulties to give up previous contracting habits 
• The fear of change and resistance against new acquisition approach 
• The perception that performance measures are difficult to understand and 
complicated to implement  
• Try to implement all kinds of service acquisitions 
• The shift of changing emphasis from process to outputs 
• Lack of knowledge about performance-based acquisition  
• Lack of communication between contractors and government 
PBSA proposes solution for the government agencies to improve service quality 
and reduce costs. Properly structured PBSA allows government to get best value by 
reducing cost and increasing service quality. PBSA offers government significant gain in 
cost savings, contractor responsibility, and better performance; reduces quality 
shortcomings and customer satisfaction. PBSA has been used in the DoD environment 
successfully for years and recent administrations have given importance to it. The 
outsourcing of service in the Turkish MOD is not a new acquisition concept. MOD has 
been procuring services from the private sector for many years. But it cannot be said that 
every service acquisition in MOD provides best value to the Turkish taxpayers. To deal 
with this problem this research aimed to propose Performance-Based Service Contracting 
as a solution to the Turkish Ministry of Defense policy makers. But at the beginning of 
this research there are some concerns and question about the application of the 
Performance-Based Service Contracting to Turkish Ministry of Defense procurement 
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process. The most important ones and also focused question of this research is that “Is 
Performance-Based Service Contracting an appropriate procurement concept to support 
Turkey Ministry of Defense operations.” This research is primarily focused on and 
concerned with answering this question. 
Based on findings from previous chapters, this research recommended that it is 
time to consider PBSA as an acquisition solution in the Ministry Of Defense environment 
when procuring services. PBSA is a new concept for the Turkish Ministry f Defense 
acquisition workforce and may cause risks and problems. But if the importance of PBSA 
is understood, these risks and problems can be solved and solutions can be developed to 
overcome challenges. The PBSA concept has great potential to facilitate service 
acquisition activities and increase quality in the Turkish Ministry Of Defense 
procurement process. PBSA implementation might be applicable to the Turkish Ministry 
Of Defense service acquisition activities if the required legal regulations are enacted. To 
implement BPSA in Ministry Of Defense activities, new regulations should be enacted to 
allow government to incentivize contractors and accept industry solutions. This legal 
process requires the Turkish Parliament’s close cooperation. Also, the current contracting 
workforce should be educated and assigned permanently to the contracting positions.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In today’s world, outsourcing services from the private sector is good business 
practice for both commercial firms and government agencies when they perform their 
mission. This business practice allows government agencies to focus on their primary 
functions. Service acquisition is commonly used in the United States DoD acquisition 
environment and stands on 60 percent of DoD budget. When DoD procures service from 
the private sector it has to ensure that the taxpayer’s money gets best value in return for 
service contract. That is why PBSA was developed and mandated in the United States. 
PBSA has been used as a primary tool to get best value in return for every taxpayer dollar 
spent.  
As compared with DoD, Turkey MOD spends a smaller percentage of its defense 
budget to procure service from private sector but service acquisition is used commonly 
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for some specific services. All of the services that are procured by MOD are simple, well-
defined and repetitive requirements. Performance objectives for these kinds of 
requirements can be easily defined. It is not difficult to measure contractors’ performance 
at the end of the acquisition process. In Turkey, however, the best value concept and 
contractor performance have not been questioned until now. Political and public pressure 
on the MOD budget obligate MOD to spent its budget effectively. It is evaluated that in 
the near future Turkish MOD will outsource much more and different kinds of services 
from private sector to perform its mission.  For these reason PBSA can be good tool to 
procure services from private sector and can be solution for MOD to get best value in 
return for current services acquisitions. 
But, Turkish acquisition rules and regulations can be barriers to implement 
Performance Based Service Acquisition within Turkey. There are some legal constraints 
that might affect the application of PBSC within the Turkish MOD. In Turkey, the only 
contract type used in the public-acquisition process is firm-fixed price and Procurement 
Contracts Law (No: 4735) does not allow government contracting entities to use 
incentives, which prevents government side from motivating contractors and get best 
value as much as American government can do. There are many implementation 
problems stemming from both government and industry sides in the U.S., where this 
acquisition method developed. It is difficult to implement PBSA in MOD with the current 
acquisition personnel because this acquisition method requires careful consideration to 
prepare performance standards and metrics.  
To overcome all these barriers and problems it needs further research.  This 
research is just a starting point and it does not cover all the topics related to the PBSA. 
This MBA research only explains PBSA in general terms rather than in a detailed 
manner. Further research may add greater understanding of the PBSA concept and its 
possible contributions to Turkey’s public procurement process. The followings are the 
important topics in need of further research.  
• What should be done to deal with legal barriers that prevent the 
implementation of PBSA effectively in Turkish public procurement 
process? 
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• What are the training requirements to implement PBSA in Turkish 
Ministry of Defense procurement environment?  
• Which services type Turkish Ministry of Defense mostly used are suitable 
for the PBSA? 
• Which organizational change should be done to implement PBSA 
successfully in Turkish Ministry of Defense procurement environment? 
PBSA is a new procurement concept for Turkey, one that still has many questions 
and problems. This research could not address them all. Its intent was to call the attention 
of Ministry of Defense policy makers to this procurement concept. The ultimate goal of 
this research is to serve Turkey and the Turkish people by introducing a new contracting 
method to save money and increase the quality of service that is procured from the 
private sector. 
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